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International Human Rights is a multi-layered ideological system at the intersection of law, 
cultural narrative, social norms, collective ethics, and personal morality. Its lofty ideals are in 
direct challenge to the everyday forces of destruction and chaos that threaten order, which Julia 
Kristeva, in The Powers of Horror, claims is the substance of the abject. People’s fascination and 
perturbation with the abject are embodied in our cultural obsessions: one being the popularity of 
literatures depicting violent atrocities happening in faraway places—specifically, child-soldier 
narratives. The argument presented in this thesis is premised by the observation that global 
literatures tend to pander to the comforts of a Western readership, keeping abject content 
bracketed out of the narrative with only suggestions of the real violence taking place in conflict-
ridden states. The thesis argues that two texts, Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation and Kourouma’s 
Allah is Not Obliged, have challenged such trends by presenting the abject to readers through 
their narrators. In so doing, they begin to close the comfortable gap between reader and subject, 
as the reader’s only point of access to the literature is filtered through a narrator who embodies 
abjection himself. The introduction provides a framework for understanding human rights 
literatures through the lens of Kristeva’s theory of abjection, and the chapters that follow are in-
depth character studies of the two texts’ narrators and their linguistic habits. The chapters 
illustrate how and to what ends the authors deviate from convention in order to foster productive 
identification between reader and subject. 
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INTRODUCTION | CLOSING THE GEOPOLITICAL GAP BETWEEN READER AND SUBJECT: 
UNDERSTANDING LITERARY REPRESENTATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
THROUGH THE LENS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 
 
Julia Kristeva, in the conclusion of her essay The Powers of Horror: An Essay on 
Abjection, poses a challenge to the reader. After 200 pages of theoretical scaffolding and 
illustrations through French literature, the Bible, and historiographies of hatred pursuant to her 
unveiling of chaos, Kristeva nudges her reader, wondering if, “perhaps [the reader] might be able 
to read this book as something other than an intellectual exercise,” to acknowledge the dark 
undercurrents that are, “when all is said and done…the other facet of religious, moral, and 
ideological codes on which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of society” (209).  
It is a stark moment of practicality, a provocation of the theoretical to become the actualized. As 
I will discuss, Kristeva names the abject as the primer and safeguard of our protective, orderly 
systems of ideology—an underlying, beyond-reach component of what we refer to as a civilized 
society, a chaos to which we have a hardwired aversion. Kristeva suggests that her theory of 
abjection can and should assume a practically applied function for examining the ethics of our 
ideological systems.  
✧   MAPPING THE ABJECT ONTO HUMAN RIGHTS LITERATURES 
International Human Rights is one such multi-layered ideological system at the 
intersection of law, cultural narrative, social norms, collective ethics, and personal morality. 
Human rights law has a reciprocal relationship with its contingent policies, shaping society as 
much as society shapes it. Its lofty ideals are in direct challenge to the everyday forces of 
destruction and chaos that threaten the Symbolic, which Kristeva claims is the substance of the 
abject. People’s simultaneous fascination and perturbation with the abject are embodied in our 
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cultural obsessions: a notable one for the Western hemisphere being the recent popularity of 
literatures depicting violent atrocities happening in faraway places—specifically, narratives 
about the acts committed by child soldiers in militant factions. From their comfortable sitting 
rooms, readers can sit in awe of the savage acts of the other while maintaining a safe distance 
from the possibility that such circumstances could ever happen to them.  While literatures 
depicting human rights abuses endeavor to spark conversation, increase awareness, and catalyze 
action on the part of the reader, the texts have a tendency to simply re-affirm the rights of the 
Western reader, leaving them firmly distanced from the violation and in a better position to 
appreciate their own status as a rights-bearing, autonomous citizen.  
Sophia McLennan and Joseph Slaughter discuss the detachment of reader from subject in 
a way that has concrete implications for how the public conceives of human rights themselves, as 
audiences are informed of and perceive the reality of the rights climate through literatures like 
child-soldier narratives.  Unfortunately, distance between reader and subject creates a perpetual 
“gap between the imagination of Human Rights and the state of their practice” (4), something 
counterproductive to the supposed function of human rights literatures. There are a variety of 
explanations for this result. A prescient theory is that global literatures tend to pander to the 
comforts of a Western readership, keeping abject content bracketed out of the narrative and 
including only mere suggestions of the real violence, death, and destruction taking place in 
conflict-ridden states. However, there are authors who have challenged such trends by presenting 
the abject to readers through their narrators. In so doing, they begin to close this perceived gap 
between reader and subject, as the reader’s only point of access to the literature is filtered 
through a narrator who embodies abjection himself. As Kristeva would agree, literature is one of 
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the most sophisticated tools we have to better understand our natural impulses to draw near, but 
not too near, the violent and chaotic forces of abjection. 
 Two authors of child-soldier narratives who push back against the tendency to partition 
off violence from human rights literatures are Uzodinma Iweala and Ahmadou Kourouma. Both 
Iweala and Kourouma employ narrators characterized in and through abjection: they represent 
the disturbing reality that there is no clear delineation between victim and perpetrator, and that, 
given certain circumstances, any human being may be capable of committing the acts they show 
and tell to the reader. To argue this point, I will provide an introductory overview of the 
problematic pandering to Western narrative conventions recorded in the human rights literary 
discourse community, and establish a definition of the subject/abject character found in both 
Iweala and Kourouma’s narratives, whom I name the “deject” after the Kristevan idiom. In 
Chapter One, I investigate the narrator of Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation, Agu, and his material 
and linguistic expressions of Kristeva’s theory of abjection. In Chapter Two, I discuss how the 
narrator of Kourouma’s Allah Is Not Obliged, Birahima, is characterized as a willful participant 
in warfare first through his associations with his abject mother, a woman ostracized for her 
physical disabilities and unorthodox religious practices. In so doing, I establish the deject 
narrator as a literary mechanism for bringing Western readers closer to identifying with the 
perpetrators of atrocities, closing the comfortable gap between the self and the other in order to 
render a more complex portrait of rights violations and the multitudes of people they affect. 
✧   WESTERN CONVENTION AND LITERARY DISTORTION 
While the mission of much of human rights literature is to give voice to the voiceless, 
spark conversation, and allow for collective witnessing, the uncomfortable truth is that literature 
can also be the tool with which writers might construct an illusory human rights climate, a trend 
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initially borne of ideals but that results in counter-productivity. All cultural forms that give voice 
to human rights violations have the potential to contribute to a grander narrative that drives a 
normative, but nonetheless illusory, understanding of an equitable rights climate.  The most 
ubiquitous genre that discusses an ideally equitable, though hierarchical, society is the 
Bildungsroman, the coming-of-age narrative form favored by citizens of Western democratic 
states. A historic genre, the first Bildungsroman appeared in 18th century Germany, originating 
with the publication of Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship. Karl 
Morgenstern calls the Bildungsroman “the most noble category of the novel,” (654) a sub-genre 
that depicts a character’s leaving behind of childish naiveté and becoming enlightened in the 
social and civic realities of their world. Morgenstern notes that the Bildungsroman depicts the 
formation of the main character into an exemplary, productive member of German society, but 
also “promotes the development of the reader to a greater extent than any other kind of novel” 
(654-655).  The genre encourages the reader to combine his1 inner characteristics with his 
external environment, finding a societal niche in which he can find the full expression of his 
civic productivity.  
 Bildungsromane operate on the premise that there is a knowable, hierarchical social 
order in which a given citizen can find a position in society to be economically productive and 
politically active.  This idealism inspires in the reader a sense that there is a knowable order to 
life, and while scholars like Morgenstern have shown the benefits of such representation, there 
are alternative arguments that discuss the detriments such generic conventions might have on a 
contemporary readership. Joseph Slaughter discusses the Bildungsroman as a genre with a 
normative content trajectory that reinforces an understanding of a stable, categorical social order 
                                                
1 While both female and male child soldiers are recruited at nearly similar rates, and many texts foreground the 
experience of the female child soldier, I will be using a male pronoun to keep consistent with my focus on the male 
narrators of Uzodinma Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation and Ahmadou Kourouma’s Allah is Not Obliged. 
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when, in fact, such order does not exist in equal iterations throughout the globe.  In referring to 
the form of the Bildungsroman and the content of human rights literatures, Slaughter introduces 
the concept of “enabling fictions.” “Enabling fictions” point to the detrimental effects idealistic 
representations may have on those attempting to form a somewhat realistic understanding of 
social systems. These texts may render falsities in service of an idealistic purpose: “Human 
rights and the Bildungsroman are mutually enabling fictions: each projects an image of the 
human personality that ratifies the other’s vision of the ideal relations between individual and 
society” (1407). The difficulty with this reciprocity is that, in narrating the process of achieving 
equal rights and citizen status, authors may underestimate literature’s utility as a truth-telling 
mechanism, causing readers and the general public to discern that the fight for human rights 
continues to gain positive ground.  
In attempting to reinforce the necessity of the Symbolic Order central to the 
Bildungsroman’s purpose, writers may uncritically employ a narrative form that obfuscates the 
fact that large and small atrocities continue to occur around the globe and that many societies are 
indeed unstable, leaving citizens with little choice to find their natural place in the established 
system. This is ultimately damaging to the movement itself: the illusion of an equal rights 
environment hides and contributes to the opposite, and allows for rights violations to occur 
beyond the purview of the public imagination and under the radar of our legal and cultural order. 
✧   ELEMENTS OF ABJECTION 
Kristeva’s theory of the abject contains multiple case studies in moving beyond the 
notion of an ideal system of order and probing the chaotic ruptures of the Symbolic, focusing on 
language and the feminine. Put forth in Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva finds fertile 
ground in the chaos that breaks through order: particularly those transgressions of poetry against 
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traditionally structured language. The categorization of marginality, of other, foregrounds 
poetry’s rebellious stylistics. The artist/poet becomes a marginal speaking subject who breaks 
through the constraints of patriarchal authority and language conventions. In discussing this 
categorization, Toril Moi observes, “If ‘femininity’ has a definition at all in Kristevan terms, it is 
simply, as we have seen, as ‘that which is marginalized by the patriarchal symbolic order’” (165). 
A conflation of femininity with marginalization “allows us to view this repression of the 
feminine in terms of positionality(…) What is perceived as marginal at any given time depends 
on the position one occupies” (165). Kristeva’s Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection simply 
narrows the focus on marginalization to the (in-)edible morsel of filth and death, the undertow of 
cleanliness and life. 
In expanding upon the works of Freud and Lacan, Kristeva builds her theory using the 
stages of psychosexual development and understands them as a reflection of our lives within the 
Symbolic Order as a whole. As is commonly understood in the psychoanalytic tradition, the 
Oedipal crisis solidifies the mother as not me, rejected by the child. Prior to this crisis, the 
mother was the site of total unification, a sublime expanse of complete cohesion. A distinct 
fragmentation occurs after the child enters the Symbolic. No longer identifying with/as the 
mother, the child rejects and excludes her under the watchful eye of the father, the utmost 
symbol of authority, order, and hierarchical categorization. Kristeva understands the mother’s 
place as one of exile and negation, a threat to the order of the father that the author terms the 
abject. Abjection, then, is the undercurrent—sensed, but not easily pointed to—of disruption and 
deconstruction that lies beneath the safe boundaries of systematization. Not an object, as 
objectification has utility in delineating boundaries of me and not me, there is only one 
characteristic of the abject: “that of being opposed to I” (1). The abject blurs the lines of order, 
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collapses meaning in a way that reveals all categories as constructed; providing brief glimpses 
into the porousness of identity, the illusory structures of society, and the chaos beneath order.  
Because identity is reliant on a subconscious pull toward categorization and away from 
order, we can find the abject and our repulsion of it in our daily experiences. Bodily fluids, 
unsanitary conditions, and lifeless bodies trigger psychosomatic impulses to expel the threat of 
death, to bring us back into the neat categorization of me, a wholeness for which we are 
constantly searching. We perform this process of pushing away on an individual and collective 
scale, a similar drive marking a precedent for our systems of safety, security, and cleanliness. 
For Kristeva, the rotten, anarchic aspects of society, the abject, render insight to our 
places and subjectivity within the Symbolic. These places of rebellion, regarded as collapses of 
meaning into nothingness, are reminders that we are actively and defensively constructing our 
lived realities. We maintain order and stave off degradation for the sake of finding unity and 
maintaining a clean and proper body. To better understand the constraints of the Symbolic, one 
must confront its ruptures, maybe even explore them. This is an obvious function of literature, 
which “may also involve not an ultimate resistance to but an unveiling of the abject: an 
elaboration, a discharge, and a hollowing out of abjection through the Crisis of the Word” (208). 
Literature’s linguistic component contributes to its “privileged status,” to generate “the ultimate 
coding of our crises, of our most intimate and most serious apocalypses” (208). In writing 
literature that engages the abject, writers unconsciously give parts of themselves over to 
abjection, approaching it as closely as anyone can in order to reveal the truth and demystify the 
power of that which we push away.  
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✧   HUMAN RIGHTS LITERATURE AS ENGAGING ABJECTION 
At its very core, the act of witnessing must encompass a horrific component: one does not 
witness something unless it includes traumatization or ideological truth-telling, often both. 
Human rights literatures capitalize on paradox in their aim to convey the signification of dis-
order as a means to endorse order: witnessing a violation of human rights or re-establishment of 
rights acknowledges systemic failure and points to the necessity of the system itself. As the 
public gained a greater awareness of rights violations, writers felt compelled to facilitate a 
literary witnessing. Sidonie Smith and Kay Schaffer, in their vast work on life writing and 
trauma literatures, cite the “wide-scale transformations—geographic, economic, political, 
cultural, and psychic” that occurred in the 1980s as creating conducive conditions for examining 
the breakdown of once-stable social and political structures through literature. These 
“transformations” the authors specify include  
[t]he opening of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union into ethnic states…the 
end of the policy of apartheid in South Africa, the global movements of indigenous 
peoples to reclaim lands…the changing demography of the new Europe through 
immigration, the rise (And collapse) of Asian economies and the expansion of the Asian 
diaspora, the refugee crisis around the globe, and before and after September 11, 2001, 
the rise of international religious fundamentalisms. (5) 
Changes in political regimes, domestic border breakdown, racial and ethnic integration, and 
territorial disputes threaten the social and cultural ideologies that provide a sense of safety, order, 
and categorization for a people. Established ideologies resist heterogeneity and chaos, and when 
chaos breaks through the structure of the self-referential, homogenizing Symbolic, the abject is 
revealed. This unveiling is what drives people to write and unconsciously approach the abject in 
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an effort to better understand what may be a curse to their sense of bodily and ontological 
security (Kristeva 16). 
In mapping a Kristevan reading on to human rights literatures, it is important we turn to 
the authority that constructed the human rights system in the first place: the drafters of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The ideals behind enabling fictions of human rights are 
dictated by the same authorities: mostly White, Anglo-European leaders of powerful nation 
states influenced by democracy and Enlightenment-era understandings of human dignity. Joseph 
Slaughter determines the effects of such idealistic portraiture in his investigation of the 
Bildungsroman, which by convention renders a Western, democratic rising to citizenry in an 
effort to make visible the universal dignity and contingent rights of humanity as a whole.  In 
constructing human rights as a legal system, policymakers borrowed heavily from the vocabulary 
of the Bildungsroman and other texts considered within the early human rights corpus, giving 
further credence to literary representations of international equality as though they mirror reality. 
As Slaughter highlights, conflating idealistic literary form with legal and political function 
glosses over the human tendency toward hierarchical supremacy and systemic inequality. As is 
clear today, the romantic façade of a stable, knowable system of order makes it less likely for 
viewers to peer beyond the margins of the ideal, where quotidian rights violations occur on a 
massive and insidious scale. 
✧   WESTERN AUDIENCES AND GEOPOLITICAL DISTANCE 
Demographically, there is a geographic chasm between the literature’s readership and its 
content. Therefore, making texts consumable seems to have established a series of problematic  
conventions that cater to a Western readership and reinforce the veil of equal rights codification, 
in turn fueling the complacency necessary for violations to occur on an international scale. 
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Publishing traumatic truth-telling, Smith and Schaffer write, provides “commodified experiences 
for general audiences with diverse desires, and also for an increasing number of niche audiences 
interested in particular kinds of suffering,” a pattern reliant on “the increasing education, 
disposable income, and leisure time of the post-World War II generations in Western democratic 
nations and pockets of modernities elsewhere around the globe” (11). The pattern’s persistence is 
contingent on the economic and publishing trends of a Western market, which in turn shapes the 
literary discourse itself. Consider Smith & Schaffer’s designation of the industry’s Western 
dependency which “affects the kinds of stories published and circulated, the forms those stories 
take, and the appeals they make to audiences” (14).  A strong Western influence tends to alter the 
literature, which “may lose [its] local specificity and resonance in translation” (15).  In marketing 
texts through the lens of a Western readership, the audience has disproportionate influence on the 
literature’s content, making the characters and events malleable in terms of established 
conventions, and those tend heavily toward Western tropes.  
In alignment with Slaughter’s exploration of Western forms, Smith and Schaffer call 
specific attention to the Bildungsroman in regards to “the market for personal stories, often 
telling of individualist triumph over adversity, of the ‘little person’ achieving fame, of people 
who struggle and survive illness, catastrophe, or violence” and its appeal to “to readers and 
viewers in the West,” noting its rapid popularity in the age of a global marketplace. Slaughter 
would extend Schaffer & Smith’s argument to include the particularly detrimental effects that 
privileging such narrative content has on public conceptions of rights as a whole, essentially 
fostering the environment for further rights violations to occur in the underbelly of established 
systems of order. 
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 Slaughter notes that his exploration is not totalizing. He hopes to establish a blueprint for 
other scholars to investigate other forms of literature and their contributions to the dissemination 
of rights norms, with a hope that “clarifiying the hegemonic complicity between the 
Bildungsroman and human rights might offer a methodology for thinking the formal and 
ideological human rights implications of other, nonhegemonic literary genres” (1407-1408). 
Scholars have been taking up this call for expanding the investigation into the real-world 
implications of mapping literary narratives onto the public imaginary of human rights. This is 
particularly prevalent in African studies, as a postcolonial framework allows for a fruitful mining 
of the relationship between the heavily Western audience and the trend of African authors 
conforming to Western conventions. Slaughter chose to start his investigation with the 
Bildungsroman, the generic embodiment of Western democratic idealism, because of its 
contemporary global ubiquity. It has staged a type of generic imperialism through market 
pressure, mapping itself onto representations of foreign cultures by authors who feel that to be 
heard, they must sanitize and minimize their cultural otherness. The more a narrative is inclusive 
of the comfortable consumables Western audiences are familiar with, the more likely an author is 
to be heard in a competitive market.  
As scholars like Akin Adesokan have noted, the economic environment both warps the 
literary historiography of the African continent and places significant economic power in the 
hands of Western consumers. Adesokan notes this shift as found in works written by young 
Africans and marketed primarily outside of African nations, where the most prizes are awarded 
and bestsellers are marketed using the trappings of a highly developed economy (16). The 
possibility for reinforcing global hegemony is clear to Adesokan, as he predicts  
If this phenomenon advances literary cultures in postcolonial contexts, it does so through a 
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process of “reversed extraversion”—the centripetal dispersal of influence of a novel first 
published outside of its author’s primary sphere of interest. This institutional development 
represents a noteworthy move for the transformation of an audience into a market.  (16) 
Through Adesokan’s consideration of the politicized economic influence on African writing, it is 
clear that this tendency to fit within Western paradigms enables an unequal power system not 
unlike that of global colonialism. One of the texts he presents as exemplary of this dynamic is the 
popular child-soldier narrative. Texts discussing instances of child-soldierdom are particularly 
fascinating to investigate, as the explicit depiction of violence in African tribal wars make them 
particularly susceptible to internalizing and bolstering established stereotypes about the continent.  
Adesokan concisely surmises this by referring to some child-soldier narratives as “ ‘scatological’ 
writing, the idea of evoking the observance of bodily functions—eating, excretion, copulation, 
and so on—in luscious prose and linking it to the negative exercise of power” (12).  However, it 
is clear that the Western influence tends to push the texts to one of two extremes: either in 
bolstering the “dark continent” caricature, or casting the African citizen as steadfastly victimized 
by their government and/or culture. 
✧   RESISTING DOMINANT LITERARY TRENDS: TOWARD A MORE AMBIGUOUS 
CHARACTERIZATION 
 As Joseph Slaughter would agree, caricatures of the combatants as either void of morality 
or as purified victims distort an audience’s understanding of the rights environment in the 
African states. While Adesokan understands some narratives as distilled through a hyper-violent 
lens of Western/white cultural superiority, Maureen Moynagh notes a contradictory tendency to 
cast characters as “sanitized victim,” which means “writers have to bracket out the violence 
committed by child soldiers. This bracketing of violence is easier to accomplish in the third-
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person accounts” (44). This “bracketing” of violence, essentially a distancing between 
perpetrator and action, reflects Western readership preferences. Westerners with a penchant for 
humanitarian stories prefer to keep the victims and perpetrators of those stories at a safe distance: 
as a function of other, characters must fit within operational categories that fulfill a comfortable 
narrative construction. The narrative’s purpose is, often, to remind the reader of their protected 
rights and expressive liberties rather than cast the rights violation in more complex, ambiguous 
terms. In order reaffirm their identities as privileged rights-bearers, readers must push away, and 
keep from them, those who willingly live in and contribute to the chaos at the margins of the 
rights system.  A caricature or distilled version of this person makes the texts more consumable 
and more comfortable for the primary market. 
 The influence of the Western market remains strong, but there are authors who have 
pushed back against the necessity to please an outside readership. Ahmadou Kourouma and 
Uzodinma Iweala have both authored child-soldier narrators resistant to the categorizations of 
caricatured villain and white-washed victim, producing texts that approach the ambiguity of a 
hybrid victim/perpetrator figure. Both of these texts fall under Adesokan’s “scatological” 
designation, as they use much imagery surrounding filth, excrement, and violence to make the 
reader an active participant in incivility and destruction. Iweala’s 2006 novella Beasts of No 
Nation, follows young Agu in a stream-of-consciousness narrative in a nameless West African 
state. Kourouma’s Allah is Not Obliged (2007) tells outspoken Birahima’s journey in the 
glamorous militias of Johnson and Taylor as he moves through Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra 
Leone. The two narrators discuss the range of thought and emotion that occur to someone who, 
victimized by the political and social circumstances of his nation, participates willingly in child 
warfare. 
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The abject, as Julia Kristeva describes in her essay, The Powers of Horror, is clearly 
present in both material and hegemonic forms. However, both Iweala and Kourouma employ 
narrators that transcend stereotypical child soldier characterizations and speak to their 
victimization, willingness, and guilt about their duties as child soldiers. In so doing, Iweala and 
Kourouma’s narrators exist in and speak from the liminal grey area between pure victim and 
absolute villain. An ambiguous characterization deviates from the narrative trend of removing 
violence and agency from the child soldier. Portraying the child soldier as a combination of 
victim, abject, and agent, have led me to read Iweala’s and Kourouma’s narrators as hybrid 
subject-abject figures, also known as the Kristevan “deject.” The deject is an exile who lives 
outside normative moral and social codes, a criminal who schemes, lies, and kills without raising 
authority’s attention. In fact, the deject uses the outward presentation of abiding by systems of 
order as a tool to ultimately destroy it. Kristeva refers to pre-meditated crime and serial criminals 
as being exemplary of abjection, pointing to “any crime, because it draws attention to the frag- 
ility of the law” but specifically to “premeditated crime, cunning murder, hypocritical revenge” 
as more closely approaching the abject, because “they heighten the display of such fragility ” (4). 
The deject is the human embodiment of abjection, in that he “is immoral, sinister, scheming, and 
shady” (4), a “debtor who sells you up, a friend who stabs you” (4). Most relevant to the 
discussion of the dejects in child-soldier narratives, Kristeva identifies the abject core of “the 
traitor, the liar, the criminal with a good conscience, the shameless rapist, the killer who claims 
he is a savior” (4). As I will discuss in the proceeding chapters, the narrators in Iweala and 
Kourouma’s texts often follow-up descriptions of horrific violence with expressions of guilt, 
prayer orations, and even justifications of the acts as being for their greater good. The deject 
operates best under the veil of abiding by Symbolic authority while doing everything he can to 
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undermine it. 
 Iweala and Kourouma employ the deject as a means to call attention to the rampant 
inequality occurring in the international rights environment. Both Agu and Birahima assist in 
ripping open the seams of the Symbolic through grotesque anecdotes and laughable 
contradictions, exposing the dynamic facets of chaos the rights system is attempting to order. To 
negotiate this paradox, both authors employ a speaker who makes clear his willful choice in 
living outside the moral codes of his society. In so doing, both authors resist pandering to a 
Western audience: specifically, they resist acquiescing to readers who want to privilege a 
distorted narrative and distract from the surreptitious violence occurring on a massive global 
scale. The narrators live in an uncomfortable proximity to the abject, and in order to consume the 
text, a Western readership must acknowledge the narrator’s humanity.  The reader must confront 
their own position in an unequal rights environment through identifying with some aspect of the 
narrator’s humanity despite his horrific acts.  
The ideal outcome of using this typified narrator, then, is to force the reader to ask, “Am I, 
too, capable of such things?” and even, perhaps, “under what conditions would I choose to do 
such a thing?” Through their narrators, Iweala and Kourouma gesture toward an examination of 
the conditions that foster the environment for rights violations to take place. The authors suggest 
that confronting the abject forces a privileged readership to consider the systemic issues 
contributing to these outbursts of violence and death, and even their own positions in said system. 
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CHAPTER ONE | THE CHILD SOLDIER DEJECT: MATERIAL AND SYMBOLIC 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE ABJECT IN UZODINMA IWEALA’S BEASTS OF NO NATION 
 
“When I am saying all of this, she is just looking at me and I am seeing water in her eye. So I am 
saying to her, if I am telling this to you it will be making you to think that I am some sort of beast 
or devil. Amy is never saying anything when I am saying this, but the water is just shining in her 
eye. And I am saying to her, fine. I am all of this thing. I am all of this thing, but I am also having 
mother once, and she is loving me.” Uzodinma Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation 
 
At the close of Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation, the young protagonist Agu speaks raw 
truths to his American aid worker, Amy. He is in therapy with this “white woman from America 
who is coming here to be helping people like me” (141). People like Agu are former West 
African child soldiers recently liberated from tribal warfare by foreign humanitarian aid 
organizations. This scene, in which the altruistic Westerner, the white purveyor of democracy 
and human rights, stages a rescue and assists in the rehabilitation of affected peoples, is familiar 
to readers of human rights literatures.  Such a trope is the product of a surge in narratives 
depicting the humanitarian atrocity of child-soldiering; the literature itself a response to a notable 
increase in the number of children being recruited to military factions engaged in civil war 
during the 1990s. As discussed in the introduction, more and more literature containing child-
soldier characters saturated the market and found a loyal audience in Western readerships. This 
began influencing the literature itself, as authors considered reader preferences in their depictions 
of child soldiers and their war-torn conflicts.  
As previously discussed, some authors push back against Western tropes in their 
representations of child-soldierdom. Iweala’s narrator, Agu, defies a common understanding of 
child soldiers as straightforward victims, and instead presents readers with a complex, hybrid 
subject termed the “deject” who retains his autonomy and speaks clearly about the choice to 
participate in the violence and destruction involved in tribal warfare and associated with the 
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abject. Before discussing the deject, I will first establish a working definition for the particular 
discursive trend this character is pushing against, known as the “Savage-Victim-Savior 
paradigm.” I will then discuss how Agu’s character is inextricably intertwined with the abject, 
first through his experiences with murder and his proximity to bodily fluids; and secondly, 
through the language with which he narrates the text. 
✧   THE SAVAGE-VICTIM-SAVIOR PARADIGM: A STARTING POINT 
The scene transcribed above is, though out of context, reflective of an enduring paradigm 
traceable in human rights discourse. Deemed by Makau Mutua the “Savage-Victim-Savior” 
(SVS) Paradigm, this trope places participants in and victims of rights violations in prescribed 
categories. Comprised of three main components, the SVS paradigm is a “three-dimensional 
compound metaphor… its discourse uni-directional and predictable, a black-and-white 
construction that pits good against evil” (202). Mutua deconstructs this metaphor in an effort to 
show it as an extension of White savior imagery into cross-cultural, globalized discourse. Mutua 
reveals the utility of the paradigm, premised on Western “altruism,” as maintaining the West’s 
privileged position in an international hegemony. 
The SVS paradigm is deeply embedded in literatures meant to disseminate human rights 
norms, and its effects are far-reaching: a similar hierarchical inequality, one that privileges and 
centralizes Western culture, can be found in common understandings of the international rights 
environment. This creates a chasm between postcolonial lenses of historical and contemporary 
systems of power and the idyllic rhetoric of human rights upon which global justice is based. 
Margaret Kohn writes that this is primarily a narrative issue: “postcolonial critics see universal, 
abstract concepts as metaphors that are embedded in problematic narratives […] [which] can 
have the unintended consequence of undermining the practices that could help make the world 
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more just” (188).  Indeed, these problematic narratives have begun garnering more attention as 
scholars seek to identify and address the systemic inequality illustrated in the literature of human 
rights. This is a mission with concrete implications: the narratives of human rights abuses and 
humanitarian intervention influence the language around which policy and legal statutes are 
built. Because of its out-sized influence on people’s lived experiences, Mutua understands this 
metaphor as both “damning” and far-reaching (201). The metaphor infects policy-making and 
contributes to an unequal rights environment heavily reliant on the altruism and power of the 
West to solve the world’s problems. 
Mutua contends the SVS metaphor is one “that depicts an epochal contest pitting savages, 
on one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other” (201). In maintaining a narrative binary 
of good and evil, the Western human rights disseminators are cast as the heroic problem-solvers, 
and the non-Western victim of human rights abuses is cast as the passive object of Western 
identity validation. However, after placing the final scene from Beasts of No Nation (transcribed 
above) in its narrative context, one can see how distinctly different it is than narratives that 
substantiate the Savage-Victim-Savior paradigm. Rather than positioning the Western savior as 
the point of focalization and the filter through which the survivor of rights abuses might recover 
their subjectivity, this humanitarian character, Amy, is mostly silent.  
✧   BEASTS OF NO NATION AS CHALLENGING THE SVS PARADIGM 
Amy treats Agu like a subordinate, but we know this because Agu expressly identifies 
their inherently unequal relationship and calls attention to its absurdity. The only second-hand 
dialogue we receive from Amy, a majority silent character, is pressing Agu to speak more, to 
articulate his thoughts and emotions to her. Agu sees a fundamental problem with these 
encouragements, believing that, “I am like old man and she is like small girl because I am 
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fighting in war and she is not knowing what war is” (141), which results in enduring frustrations 
for Agu as he is “saying to her sometimes, I am not saying many thing because I am knowing too 
many terrible thing to be saying to you” (141). Here, Agu attempts to shed light on the vast 
distance between the two of them, not only in age or experience, but most importantly as a 
means to distinguish the obvious difference between their positionality in the international rights 
environment. Agu’s character, in illustrating this particular rehabilitation method’s flaws, echoes 
Mutua’s sentiment that “the human rights corpus, though well-meaning, is fundamentally 
Eurocentric…[and] falls within the historical continuum of the Eurocentric colonial project, in 
which actors are cast into superior and subordinate positions” (204). Agu subverts this 
positioning, drawing attention to Amy’s naïveté and the ultimately futile nature of their 
interactions. Agu’s refusal to be categorized as a helpless victim persists throughout the duration 
of the preceding narrative, a first-person account that starts at his initial capture and catalogues 
his journey in a traveling tribal militia made up mostly of child soldiers. Agu, our narrator, is not 
located in a particular country; but, rather, he speaks with subjectivity from the chaotic margins 
of orderly society as a whole. 
The child soldier, seen as a novel figure experiencing a profound violation of human 
rights, has garnered attention in the literary discourse community precisely because of its refusal 
to be located within the Savage-Victim-Savior construction. Maureen Moynagh discusses the 
ambiguous, heterogeneous identity of the child soldier and its troublesome representation in 
human rights literatures. Aligned with Mutua, Moynagh calls into focus the trending literary 
paradigm of human rights narratives  that leans heavily on the categorical innocence of the 
victimized child and capitalizes on the “politics of life” while downplaying the “politics of death” 
(Fassin as qtd. in Moynagh 40). She believes the child soldier challenges the “tidy binary” of 
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innocent and guilty as he is equally victim and perpetrator, both violator and violated.  Her 
discussion of the child soldier first highlights the rehabilitation narrative that underscores many 
pieces of human rights literatures, portraying the subject of human rights violations as passive, 
innocent, and in need of rescue.  
✧   AGU AS DEJECT: RESISTANT TO VICTIMIZATION 
The agency of the child soldier obscures the delineation between victim and combatant, 
because, as Moynagh observes, “while NGOs like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, 
and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers insist that child soldiers themselves ought to 
be understood as ‘victims,’ the child-soldier figure remains an ambiguous one” (41). The 
tendency to see these willful agents as only victims of their circumstances can be understood 
through a psychological and socialized aversion to the abject, a deep-seated refusal to confront 
the powers of chaos and horror at work beneath our neat systems of order and safety. 
Additionally, Western exceptionalism substantiates the literary pattern that forcibly categorizes 
characters as “good” and “evil,” as Western democracy must stand as a pillar for upholding 
rights and intervening during abuses. The literature that ascribes to this pattern depicts an 
imaginary rights environment, unreflective of the reality that those nations who tout their 
upstanding rights policies are the most likely to commit abuses. 
In reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that many texts that focus on the child soldier 
refuse the subject agency, making him a passive victim in need of rescue from Western 
intervention: the portrayal most comfortable for a Western readership. However, I argue that 
Agu is an example of the Kristevan “deject” figure: a hybrid subject-abject character with an 
exiled social positionality. The deject lives on the margins of society but maintains his agency 
and voice in doing so. He acknowledges his subversive, liminal existence and uses it to his 
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advantage in a society ordered by moral and social authority. In portraying the child soldier as 
both agent and victim, Iweala’s character blurs the victim/combatant binary and challenges the 
problematic iterations of the narrative Moynagh has discovered, causing a rupture in the 
archetype that allows for a persistently Eurocentric understanding of progress in the realm of 
human rights. Of primary importance—considering not only Agu’s material proximity to 
experiences with the abject, but also the maintenance of his subjectivity as one through whom 
the abject exists—is his mode of communication, the particular language with which he speaks 
his guilt into existence. Agu uses a unique form of Pidgin English, first depicted by Ken Saro-
Wiwa in his text Sozaboy, deemed “Rotten English.”  The language is a combination of tribal 
dialect and English vocabulary, and the term insinuates that the purity of English has been 
infected by or otherwise imposed upon by African languages.  It is often used in varying degrees 
by other authors of child-soldier narratives, and implies the author wants to both isolate and 
reflect the reader in the linguistic construction of the text. I argue that Rotten English, as a hybrid 
language, allows the deject to speak to the Western world at large while maintaining his 
marginalized identity as subject-abject, a decisive gesture of agency and subjectivity by a 
narrator whose type is most often cast as helpless. 
The physical and social environments of Iweala’s child soldier is characterized almost 
exclusively by the abject, forcing the reader to approach the psychosomatically and morally 
repulsive through the narrator’s experiences. As the reader (and Agu) becomes oriented with the 
novel’s plot and Agu’s imminent coercion into the tribal military, the components of abjection 
reveal themselves at increasing degrees of complexity. The opening scene of Beasts of No Nation 
begins with the sensation of bugs crawling over the speaker’s body, forcing him to want to 
sneeze, to expel the sensation, and what the reader can assume is his plight, from his body. 
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Within the same breath our narrator describes a “voice that is just touching my body like knife” 
(1). The reader’s immediate orientation with the narrative is associated with the filth of bugs 
crawling on one’s skin and the clear and present threat of death. Throughout the narrative, Agu’s 
position in the fringe military aligns with Kristeva’s discussion of abjection in such distinct and 
clear ways that it is difficult to ignore.   
✧   THE MATERIAL EXPERIENCE OF ABJECTION 
While Kristeva is firm that abjection is more so an experience than a subject or object, 
there are concrete characteristics that can be assigned to the concept in order to create a better 
understanding of how and through what we encounter the abject. Kristeva points to bodily 
reactions that function to expel an undesired substance from the body or to prevent that 
substance from entering the body. Her focus on the gag reflex in response to a loathed food is the 
most relatable, as it is a biological function as well as a psychological one; a person must first 
perceive the substance to be undesirable, to be filthy or incapable of consuming in order to 
trigger the biological reaction: “‘I’ want none of that element.. ‘I’ do not assimilate it, ‘I’ expel it” 
(3). The substance is perceived as threatening to the health and well-being of the body, and the 
biological function takes over to prevent it by preemptively starting the expulsion process of 
vomiting. The process of vomiting calls attention to the body’s, the person’s, inability to 
assimilate the substance into themselves: “it reacts, it abreacts. It abjects” (3). The impulse to 
vomit is Agu’s first reaction to his introduction of child-soldiering, when he is being beaten and 
dragged from the shelter in which he was hiding: “Again and again he is hitting me... I am trying 
to scream, but he is knocking the air from my chest... I am tasting blood. I am feeling like 
vomiting... My body is just sliding slowly from the stall out into the light and onto the mud” 
(Iweala 3). Agu is dragged out into the filth of the elements, tasting a bodily fluid in his mouth 
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and feeling the impulse to expel the perceived threat from his body; but, he does not. The 
narrative continues without Agu actually vomiting, a process that would indicate the threat being 
unassimilated into the body and the self. This initial encounter with filth suggests that Agu’s 
survival necessitates an unprecedented tolerance for violence and chaos, one he had never been 
forced to approach prior to his captivity in the tribal militia. 
Agu’s initial perceptions of his fellow soldiers are all characterized through abjection, in 
great contrast to his previously orderly life in the village: their clothes are dirty and tattered, they 
are skinny and hungry-looking, their hats and shirts are soaked with sweat. Agu describes how 
the group indiscriminately uses the world as their toilet; in fact, they are encouraged to urinate 
and defecate on the side of the road and in the middle of campsites to assert their masculinity and 
divorce them from the human need for privacy and decency. From the outset, this community of 
lost children and warring adults is inextricably linked to “ (…)bodily fluids, (…) defilement (…) 
shit...what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death” (Kristeva 3). An 
encounter with filth and bodily fluids is what Kristeva believes to be a confrontation of the self 
with the reality that the subject is indeed alive; it is these fluids that one must expel and remove 
from the body in order to continue living. In essence, the abject confronts the subject with the 
continual possibility of death, and from here, Kristeva discusses the corpse as the ultimate 
experience with abjection. 
✧   DUTY, AGENCY, AND THE ABJECT 
Agu’s position as subject-abject is hinged on the actions he must take in order to fulfill 
his duty as child soldier: to create the most corpses as possible in every village the army attacks, 
to cause chaos through bodily violence and village destruction. His first lesson in killing is an 
enemy soldier, one who has attempted to run away from the imminent slaughter that is about to 
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befall himself and his comrades. Commandant, the leader of the army into which Agu has 
become indoctrinated, forces Agu to kill the soldier to prove his worth. The experience is 
lengthy: the man makes multiple attempts to escape, taking advantage of Agu’s inability to act. 
That is, until Commandant takes Agu’s hand and begins chopping the man’s body with the 
machete, forcing Agu to finish the job he started. The experience is drenched in fluids and gore, 
as Agu describes “the blood is spilling out like milk from coconut... I am seeing each drop of 
blood and each drop of sweat flying here and there...I am feeling how the blood is just wetting on 
my leg and my face... there is just blood, blood, blood” (21). Immediately afterward, Agu begins 
vomiting uncontrollably in an attempt to expel the experience from his psyche and from his body. 
Kristeva perceives the encounter with the corpse as “the breaking down of a world that has 
erased its borders...The corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost of 
abjection” (4). The corpse is “death infecting life,” it is both “imaginary uncanniness and real 
threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing us” (4). Agu, as agent in infecting life with death, 
is wholly pushed to the margins of society and becomes that through which the abject is 
expressed: a hybrid subject-abject, one who lives on the border of life and death, “the in-between, 
the ambiguous, the composite... immoral, sinister, scheming, and shady: a terror that dissembles, 
a hatred that smiles... a debtor who sells you up, a friend who stabs you...” (4) ... A child who 
rapes mothers and daughters and then murders the entire family with a single machete. 
✧   EXISTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A LIMINAL IDENTITY 
The preliminary chapter of Powers of Horror, “Approaching Abjection,” makes it clear 
the experience of abjection is both physical and psychological: the abject is that which we use to 
solidify our own existence as living, dignified human beings, clean in bodily hygiene and social 
intention.  In that very simplistic definition, the child soldier is conventionally cast as the other, 
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the not me. In the Western mindset, we posit the phenomenon of child-soldierdom as simply not 
possible in our developed, dignified, ethically-transcendent world: it operates in service of the 
exceptionalist narrative so central to American society, identity, and codes of justice. The 
Westerner would never ask a child to chop bodies with machetes, rape women and children, 
pillage and urinate (both metaphorically and literally) upon an entire village’s way of life. The 
child soldier is the abject for the Westerner in that we keep it at arm’s length, for “if I 
acknowledge it, [the abject] annihilates me” (Kristeva 2). At the same time, our awareness of the 
child soldier allows us to further solidify our aforementioned notions of our society as developed, 
dignified, and ethical. In this way, “abject and abjection are my [the Western ideology’s] 
safeguards. The primers of my [Western] culture” (2). At first evaluation, it seems prudent of us 
to keep this threat as far away as possible, so as to not break down the safe social and ideological 
systems that allow us to live our lives. However, the demarcation of clean and dirty, moral and 
immoral, me and not me is illusory, a permeable boundary that requires constant attention and re-
substantiation in order to persist as true in our collective consciousness.  
In his condition as child soldier, Agu becomes “the one by whom the abject exists,” (8) 
what Kristeva terms as the deject. While the body and mind are wired to expel and reject the 
abject, the deject instead hovers in the ambiguity between abjective death and life: he “places 
(himself), separates (himself), situates (himself) and therefore strays instead of getting his 
bearings, desiring, belonging, or refusing” (8) (emphasis Kristeva’s). The deject both recognizes 
his abjection and divides himself from it, enacting and enforcing the abject upon others, but 
putting forth much effort to keep from assimilating it into himself. Kristeva notes this process is 
“not without laughter—since laughing is a way of placing or displacing abjection” (8). While the 
point is developed no further in her preliminary chapter, its alignment with Iweala’s narrator is 
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uncannily consistent. Agu’s indoctrination into child-soldierdom is complete when he becomes 
addicted to narcotics; “gun juice” helps to numb his emotions and increase his aggression. The 
drugs separate Agu from the horror of his actions, away from abjection, while simultaneously 
situating him as a more efficient soldier, solidifying him as that through which the abject is 
expressed. Agu often finds himself laughing while he murders his victims under the influence of 
the drugs, an attempt to maintain the precarious border between himself and the horrific reality 
of his new existence. It is through these myriad alignments with Kristevan abjection that Agu is 
cast as both the subject (narrator) and the abject (child soldier) or, to use the Kristevan term, the 
deject. 
The remainder of the narrative chronicles Agu’s struggle to live on the margins of 
ordered society: Agu’s proximity to filth and death is necessary for his survival, a contradiction 
that results in the fragmented, hybridized identity that is the child soldier. In order to live, Agu 
must persistently commit violent, immoral acts of murder, rape, and looting. Kristeva views 
abjection as a border, a fluctuation between life and death: each time Agu kills a person, he lives 
another day. Therefore, he through whom the abject is expressed, the deject, exists in a constant 
state of flux, a conflict zone where the reiteration of life and threat of death are both immediately 
close at hand.  Maureen Moynagh sees the current literary trends of the child-soldier narrative as 
an “impediment to the human rights model,” (41) as it refuses to cross the constructed 
delineation between victim and perpetrator, ignoring the ambiguous and liminal space in-
between order and chaos. Agu’s portrayal as deject challenges this trend: Iweala casts him as 
having a heterogeneous existence that defies traditional discourse archetypes. In Moynagh’s 
investigation of child-soldier narratives, she finds that often “readers are positioned instead in 
relation to the humanitarian agent, while the child- soldier figure is scripted as oddly passive and 
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effectively mute” (43). It is clear that Agu defies this pattern: the narrative is from strictly his 
perspective; the words on the page are from Agu’s consciousness. The only figure the reader can 
relate to is Agu, for he is the only character of the narrative whose complexities as an adolescent 
in an extreme circumstance are fully fleshed out: no secondary or tertiary characters are 
described beyond a single facet of representation, none of them speak to the reader without Agu 
as a filter. As readers who are given limitless access to Agu’s thoughts, emotions, and 
perceptions, we are cognizant of the contradictions raging both outside and within him as he 
attempts to negotiate his hybrid identity as child soldier and reconcile the child he was before the 
war and the monster, as he perceives himself, that he is now. This is in challenge to the tenets of 
current child-soldier narratives that dictate readerly connection with the “child-as-victim... not 
the child-as-soldier” (Moynagh 45). It is much more comfortable for a Western readership to 
objectify the child soldier as only a victim, rather than contend with him as a person with choice 
and autonomy victimized by circumstances outside of his control. 
The reader sees Agu as a victim very early in the text: after he witnesses his father’s 
murder, he is ripped from his home and forcibly introduced to the tribal military, a livelihood 
steeped in abjection and horror. However, Agu is candid with his reader: he speaks from a place 
of confusion yet conviction when he describes his wartime mindset, and by extension, the 
mindset of the group. In a description of a village raid, Agu recalls, “in the corner, there is desk 
being eaten by termite and in the other corner is bed smelling like chicken and goat. I am 
wanting to kill. We are all wanting to kill” (47). The phrase I am wanting to kill is repeated often 
throughout the narrative. For Moynagh, this is in stark contrast to other narratives’ reliance on 
the brainwashing explanation: rather than they are making me kill, Agu admits to his reader the 
he is wanting to kill. This narrative pattern subverts the popular notion that the child soldier is 
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“the ideal sentimental protagonist” (Moynagh 47) and instead reasserts that insidious notion that, 
indeed, “the child- soldier is precisely not this reassuringly pure and innocent child, but a child 
who also commits terrifying acts of brutality” (47). Agu’s articulated subjectivity when it comes 
to these acts of brutality dislocates him from mainstream society, willfully exiling himself to the 
borderlines of chaos. It is difficult for a reader to come to this conclusion, as the child soldier’s 
proximity to the abject is so striking that one’s first impulse is to either wholly reject him or re-
position him as soldier-as-victim: neither are truthful portrayals of the child soldier condition, 
which is one of ambiguity and heterogeneity, not neat categorization. 
✧   THE DEJECT AS HYBRID AND LIMINAL 
We see ambiguity and heterogeneity represented in Iweala’s narrator. The character’s 
paradoxical hybrid identity continually antagonizes itself, creating an internal conflict for Agu: 
he agonizes over the ambiguity and heterogeneity of his existence. The acts he commits oppose 
the child-like dreams he had of becoming a doctor or an engineer, something that would make 
his parents proud and allow him to contribute to the community he so loved. His innocence and 
confusion regarding the situation challenge his notion of ‘soldier,’ whom he has understood as 
proud, skilled, and honored by those around him— instead, his duties as soldier entail destroying 
communities, families, and bodies. Agu is torn between the two disparate components of his 
identity: child with dreams and soldier with duties. Agu’s interior schism arises out of the tension 
between the cultural and social ideologies of his childhood and the new doctrine of his 
soldierdom. 
This conflict is one inherent to the condition of the child, particular those in African 
literatures written by third-generation Nigerians like Iweala, as Madeleine Hron investigates. 
Hron discusses the abiku, the child-figure that is “caught up in the often interminable cycle of 
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birth, death, and return” (28). The abiku, like the deject, lives in a state of fluctuation where 
death is always close-at-hand, both threatening and re-asserting the child’s living existence. The 
author views the Nigerian notion of childhood as a “space of hybridity, possibility and, most 
importantly, resistance” (29). Most often in these texts the child, while still seen as not-yet-an-
adult, is introduced to the complex interplay of power differentials, societal constructions, and 
their visible embodiment in everyday life. Hron’s discussion notes the narrator “is constantly 
negotiating, questioning, or even resisting these cultural constructions, even by virtue of its own 
constructedness” (29). The reader sees this collision, or attempt at negotiation, occur at varying 
levels in Agu’s internal thought process: first in a justification for his actions and later in hopes 
for reparation.  
Toward the beginning of the narrative when Agu is a fresh face among the soldiers, he 
attempts to explain his actions through a naive, child-like reasoning that aims to marry his two 
competing worldviews: “I am not bad boy. I am not bad boy. I am soldier and soldier is not bad 
if he is killing. I am telling this to myself because soldier is supposed to be killing, killing, killing. 
So if I am killing, then I am only doing what is right” (23). Agu’s previous education in his 
village taught him that murder is something “bad boys” do, making him a bad boy, too. However, 
his title as “soldier” mitigates this notion, as it justifies his actions as part of his duties. Later in 
the text, Agu’s thought process becomes even more conflicted, the two identities more disparate 
than ever. In a train of thought that discusses his experiences in church and labels religion and 
education as top priorities in his village, the only way Agu is able to negotiate his hybrid identity 
is that one component will serve as reparation for the other: 
And I am thinking that when it is over I can be going to university to study. I am thinking 
that I want to be Doctor because then I will be able to be helping people instead of killing 
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them and then maybe I will be forgiven for all my sin...Then I will go back to church. I 
will go back to church to ask God for forgiveness every day. (76-77) 
It is clear that Agu yearns for when the war is over, as his previous culture and ideologies will 
then be allowable. At this time, they are submissive to his current culture of child-soldierdom, 
yet continue to surface during his daily duties. With this, it is quite easy to see how Beasts of No 
Nation can be read as a Bildungsroman, but with a deject character who subverts the normal 
trajectory of the genre’s content. Agu’s thoughts of ‘after the war’ are in reaction to his present 
circumstance: he wishes for a time where he can be re-situated in his previous culture, where 
those views and beliefs will again resurface as the dominant ideology. However, as his guerrilla 
army continues to destroy lives, villages, and entire communities, it becomes clear that Agu will 
have to find a way to tolerate the ambiguity of his hybrid identity, as a return to his life as a child 
is no longer possible, and his life as a soldier is one that entails constant physical and 
psychological negotiation of the abject. 
Prior to discussing the way in which Agu successfully speaks both from and outside his 
state as deject, one must investigate if it is even possible for the abject to speak. After all, the 
abject is categorized as neither subject nor object, but it seems as though there is space for 
subjectivity in the deject, the hybrid existence of the subject-abject.  Thea Harrington explores 
this metanarrative in Kristevan theory and finds that Kristeva’s performative act of discussing 
abjection allows the abject to speak. Harrington begins her essay with four critical questions, the 
last of which this discussion is most concerned with, which asks, “Why must the abject speak, 
and what does it say?” (139) While the main focus of Harrington’s essay is the performative 
aspect of Kristeva’s text, that through discussing abjection she approaches it and gives it voice, 
Harrington includes a discussion about the way in which the abject can speak. This is through a 
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breakdown of dialectical norms that begins with the recognition that the subject, the speaker, is 
comprised of both substance and lack, a displacement “via the workings of loss” (145). This 
causes the speaker, the subject, to “[turn] inward” (146) and come to the realization that “nothing 
is familiar, not even the shadow of a memory” (Kristeva as qtd. in Harrington 146). Therefore, 
the deject must construct his reality through his previous experiences as a child, combined with 
his current duties as soldier. These disparate experiences result in a unique articulation of his 
clashing existences. 
Agu’s hybrid existence occurs out of loss: his parents are both murdered and his village 
destroyed, making his environment one that he cannot recognize. Throughout the narrative, Agu 
interjects reminiscent flashbacks about his village and pre-war life: the function of these being to 
show how disparate his memory and reality are, which illustrates his existence in exile and 
interminable ambiguity of hybridity. Harrington notes that because the breakdown of the subject/ 
object duality causes an existence based in lack, a lack that humans fear and consistently “other” 
in order to reiterate the substantive component of their self concept, the abject can speak “only in 
a kind of ceaseless wordplay that does not mention fear... if that object is unveiled, it would 
reveal in utterance the unspeakable: the primal manque and one’s own loss within it” (146). 
While Agu feels the need to document his struggle in the manque, the hyphen of child-soldier 
narrator, he never explicitly uses the word “fear,” or “afraid;” rather, he works around the 
specific signifiers while still articulating the notion through that which is expressed through him: 
the abject.  
To elucidate this avoidance of “fear,” one must refer to the origin of loss:  Agu describes 
the moment where loss and death were closest to himself and his village, as he is trapped in a 
small shack with many other people, hoping that the guerrilla army that has invaded their homes 
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and community does not discover them. Agu asks questions and illustrates his fear through the 
horrific hypothetical situations running through the villagers’ minds, asking, “Will we die, I am 
asking? Will they be killing us?” (71). Someone in the hut begins hypothesizing about their fate, 
saying, “They will just be loading us onto one truck, bleeding like that so our blood is dripping 
from the edge ... they will be playing with our body and using our intestine as whip to be 
whipping each other and cutting off our hand and holding them to be shaking each other” (71-72). 
Never does Agu specifically articulate his fear by using the symbolic signifier for it. Instead, he 
uses our repulsion of the abject to convey this notion. Agu’s narrative not only allows the abject 
to speak by speaking through abjection (what Harrington deems the “performance of a 
practice”[139]), he employs a specific type of language that in itself is a signifier of the abject. 
✧   ROTTEN ENGLISH AS SIGNIFYING THE ABJECT 
It is quite easy to determine that the English in which Agu narrates his story is far from 
conventional. Iweala is participating in a contemporary tradition of Nigerian literature that 
employs the use of a language that combines the structures and metaphorical nature of various 
African dialects with the signifiers of English: a Pidgin English identified by Ken Saro-Wiwa as 
“Rotten English.” Saro-Wiwa employed the unique World English in his novel Sozaboy, 
describing it in the Author’s note as “a mixture of Nigerian pidgin English, broken English and 
occasional flashes of good, even idiomatic English” (Saro-Wiwa as qtd. in North 100). Michael 
North describes the language as “ruleless and lawless, an improvisation” (100) that represents the 
amalgamative ethnic and dialectic nature of Nigeria’s population. Iweala uses Rotten English as 
a means for Agu to express his hybrid identity of deject to a Western readership: the “rotting” of 
the language signifies its abject character, a decaying and decomposition of the dominant 
language that the “Western savior” has deceptively cast as globally accessible.  
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However, the outcome of the language is quite the opposite of the abject, assigning 
innovative signification to conventional signifiers through the present progressive syntax and 
reiterative verb use. In comparison, any reader would see these components lacking in traditional 
Englishes that abide by the strict structures of the Symbolic Order. North echoes this notion, 
asserting that, “his [Saro-Wiwa’s] language, in all its rottenness, turns out to embody virtues that 
are conspicuously absent from the more powerful discourses that confront him” (101). Of course, 
it is best to turn to tangible examples of these “[embodied] virtues,” those that highlight the 
“rottenness” of the language in its most obvious manifestations. 
The novel in its entirety is an example of Rotten English, but for the sake of concision I 
will use a singular substantive excerpt that incorporates all the components of the language in 
relatively few sentences. The excerpt is as follows: 
I am just hearing one blast and the whole ground began shaking shaking... I am not 
knowing where to be hiding so I am just running up and down the road. I am hearing 
another GBWEM landing right next to me. And then I was feeling fire on my body but I 
wasn’t burning. When I am looking up, I am seeing people hanging from tree like piece 
of meat. Head just hanging like coconut before it is falling off.  (79) 
It is important to note that this is a story Agu is repeating, told to him by a fellow soldier named 
Griot. His namesake refers to the West African term, particularly associated with tribes who use 
singing to preserve tribal memory, for storyteller. His words are representative of the rich oral 
tradition of his culture, and therefore, offer fertile ground for linguistic analysis. The anecdote 
above is about Griot’s initiation into the guerrilla group and how he lost his village and family to 
the horrors of war like all the other boys around him. However, Agu is the only voice here, 
conveying the story in his own language to the reader, continuing the oral tradition as he heard 
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the tale from his comrade. The first noticeable component of Rotten English at work is the 
present progressive tense. Although the anecdote is set in the past, the syntax denotes that the 
action is occurring right now, as the speaker tells it. The tense contributes an interesting 
significance to the tale, as though it is recurring over and over within its own time: the boy is 
continually re-victimized and lives the event again and again, an infinite cycle untouched by 
temporal passing. According to Iain Lambert, this atemporal structure “provides an immediacy 
which is effective in conveying the adrenalin rush” (289) that the speaker is intimating. In 
addition, this adrenalin rush is clearly occurring as a part of the subject’s fear response, a notion 
clearly made known to the reader but is not directly addressed, a continuation of Harrington’s 
discussion of the speaking abject who cannot acknowledge fear.  
The second component of Rotten English in this excerpt is the “reduplication” (Lambert 
290) of verbs, and in other places of the novel, nouns. Here the speaker describes the impact of 
artillery hitting the ground as causing it to be “shaking shaking.” The reduplication of the verb 
reiterates the impact of the machinery, making it all the more present and aggressive: instead of a 
slight tremble of the earth, we know it is significantly more abrupt and impactful, amplifying the 
chaos and panic of the scene. 
Because Rotten English assigns an inherently different and more significant meaning to 
conventional signifiers, my discussion will now turn to Kristeva’s semiotic, the undercurrent of 
language that allows us a cathartic release in opposition to the strict categorization of signs and 
signification in the Symbolic Order. The aforementioned “lawlessness” of Rotten English is 
reminiscent of the rebellion and threat against the Symbolic posed by Kristeva’s semiotic, a 
fitting alignment that capitalizes on ambiguity and heterogeneity of language that the Symbolic 
attempts to control.  
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✧   CONCLUSION: IDENTIFYING WITH THE DEJECT, APPROACHING ABJECTION 
The semiotic, as Toril Moi articulates in Sexual/Textual Politics, is categorized by the 
chora, a “rhythmic pulsion rather than a new language. It constitutes, in other words, the 
heterogeneous, disruptive dimension of language, that which can never be caught up in the 
closure of traditional linguistic theory” (161). The semiotic is the tie to our first epistemology: 
the way we understood our existence was through the womb of the mother; our communication 
to the outside world was through the fluidity and rhythms of our mother’s body, and each of us, 
both male and female, retain that way of knowing through the semiotic. The semiotic is also 
categorized by marginality: it is oppressed by and cast aside in favor of the Symbolic Order of 
linguistic communication. It continues to live in the undertones of our language, enriching 
linguistic expression while simultaneously threatening its neat composition of signifier and 
signified. Semiotic theory is one of “marginality, subversion, and dissidence” (Moi 163) and 
reflects “any other struggle against a centralized power structure” (163). We can read the pidgin 
syntax of Rotten English as following suit with the semiotic’s rebellious and revolutionary 
character, the reduplication of verbs and reliance on the present progressive as capitalizing on 
what Kristeva describes in Part I (“The Semiotic and the Symbolic”) of Revolution in Poetic 
Language as “the regulated aspect of the chora,” as its “vocal and gestural organization is subject 
to what we shall call an objective ordering, which is dictated by natural or socio-historical 
constraints” (2073). The reduplication of verbs is particularly reminiscent of a vocal and gestural 
reiteration of an important anecdotal component, we can read it with emphasis even though none 
is stylistically denoted: the ground was shaking shaking. It is this other-than-categorical 
emphasis the semiotic allows for, providing an opportunity for the reader to make a cathartic 
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connection with the narrator that defies the binaristic (signifier/signified) and heavily structured 
Symbolic. 
Iweala’s use of Rotten English is a unifying strategy, one that connects the opposing 
dualities, the inherent hybridity, of Agu’s identity as deject and allows him to express both his 
subjectivity and his needs to the dominant discourse community. The “rotting” component of the 
language, the decomposition of the strict conventions of English, parallels the child-soldier 
condition based in abjection and power differentials. Rotten English is also inherently political: 
both Nigerian and English, it mirrors the power-differentials and heterogeneity of child-
soldierdom. Its reliance on the present progressive continually “reenacts the moment when the 
abject came to exist” (152) as every past notion recurs in its own temporality, including the 
moment of Agu’s capture and thrusting into the ambiguity of the in-between. The last two 
paragraphs of the novel are, arguably, the most demonstrative of the semiotic and unifying power 
of Rotten English. I will return to the same passage with which we started as a means to provide 
an exemplar of the cyclical cohesiveness that the language imparts on the reader, as well as a 
reference for more specific examples in my conclusion. At this point in the novel, the war is 
over: one of the guerrilla soldiers has betrayed the Commandant and killed him, effectively 
relieving the group of their duties. The United Nations has sent humanitarian workers to the area 
in order to begin the process of rehabilitation, a problematic theme that is often seen in human 
rights narratives but only comes into play within the last few moments of Beasts of No Nation. 
The aid worker who is facilitating Agu’s recovery, Amy, is silent though present, as Agu’s 
narration is now directed toward the both of us: reader and Amy: 
I am saying to her sometimes, I am not saying many thing because I am knowing too 
many terrible thing to be saying to you. I am seeing more terrible thing than ten thousand 
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men and I am doing more terrible thing than twenty thousand men. So, if I am saying 
these thing, then it will be making me to sadding too much and you to sadding too much 
in this life. I am wanting to be happy in this life because of everything I am seeing. I am 
just wanting to be happy. When I am saying all of this, she is just looking at me and I am 
seeing water in her eye. So I am saying to her, if I am telling this to you it will be making 
you think that I am some sort of beast or devil. Amy is never saying anything when I am 
saying this, but the water is just shining in her eye. I am saying to her, fine. I am all of 
this thing. I am all of this thing, but I am also having mother once, and she is loving me. 
(141-142) 
Here, Agu resists the Savage-Victim-Savior paradigm and establishes himself as both monster 
and human; yes, he has acted with agency and committed horrific acts against thousands of 
people, but, he reminds Amy, he is also human: at one point, he had a mother, and she loved him 
unconditionally. This last line of the text, “I am also having mother once, and she is loving me” 
resounds with the reader because it directly incorporates the characteristics of the chora, the 
pulsations and undercurrents of the mother’s womb and the semiotic. These last two paragraphs 
illustrate Rotten English as “the interpretive speech that provides the rhythm and enchains the 
gaps” of Agu’s deject identity: markedly cathartic and affective, Rotten English allows the abject 
to speak through “a ‘bilingualism’ that betrays its ‘cohabitation with the abject’” (Harrington 
152). Its function as a language, and particularly a language that has been portrayed as the 
globally dominant means of discourse, allows Agu to speak as abject and as human. As a subject 
with a hybrid identity, Rotten English allows Agu to make a definitive gesture of agency and 
confront the “Problem of Form” that Moynagh believes consistently refuses the child soldier 
subjectivity, portraying him as passive victim in need of rescue. Instead, Rotten English 
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confronts the Western readership with “the ethically unsettling” (52), particularly because it 
allows us to see the awareness and agency that the child soldier exercises in the matter.  
Rotten English is the linguistic equivalent of the paradoxical heterogeneity of child- 
soldier, both abject and human: Agu’s life in the hyphenated ambiguity between child and 
soldier necessitates a fragmentation of identity, as Harrington describes: “one must sever oneself 
in order to be” (153); but it is this fragmentation that makes room for hope and healing. Rotten 
English provides the “possibility of catharsis” (153) that “rests in the ability to speak in two 
languages...and also to speak as an other—to speak as the abject” (153). Agu is speaking on 
behalf of both sides of his identity: a beast without a nation, and a child who was once loved by a 
mother. In casting Agu as deject and providing him with both agency and a means to impart that 
agency on the reader through Rotten English, Uzodinma Iweala creates a child soldier narrative 
that resists the literary traditions of the human rights discourse. Beasts of No Nation allows for a 
unique reader experience: one that makes the abject approachable, understandable, and even 
relatable. The human rights discourse is presently caught in a rather strict paradigm that dictates 
one portrayal of the child soldier: one that dictates the Western consciousness to keep the passive 
object at an arm’s length, distanced enough as to not become it, but close enough to solidify our 
own existences as living, civilized, and ethical. Iweala’s narrative, however, presents the 
possibility that the closer to the deject we come, the more tolerance we may have of the 
ambiguity of their existence, a heterogeneity that resists our traditional epistemology. By making 
the abject approachable and allowing it to act with agency, Iweala’s narrative precipitates a 
change in the discourse community of human rights. This change will allow the violator and 
violated equal chance at recovery, but most importantly, a recovery enacted not through the 
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Western Savior but through the healing of a fragmented and disparate identity actively catalyzed 
by the subject of the violation.  
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CHAPTER TWO | INHERITED MARGINALITY, CHOSEN EXILE: THE CHILD SOLDIER 
NARRATOR AND SYSTEMIC FAMILIAL PERSECUTION IN AHMADOU KOUROUMA’S 
ALLAH IS NOT OBLIGED 
 
On 20 November 1989, the United Nations General Assembly signed and ratified the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.  This document affirmed the child’s access to 
fundamental human rights such as “the inherent right to life” (art. 6.1) and “ [to the maximum 
extent possible] the survival and development of the child” (art. 6.2). The document dictates the 
parameters around ensuring the safety and wellbeing of any child citizen in the 140 signatory 
states, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. These articles apply to states in both peace time and 
conflict, with Article 38 being entirely dedicated to the rights of the child living amidst war: “In 
accordance with their obligations under international humanitarian law to protect the civilian 
population in armed conflicts, States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure protection 
and care of children who are affected by an armed conflict” (38.4). Since the convention’s 
enactment, however, nothing substantive has been done to prevent the continued usage of child 
soldiers in armed conflict – the practice remains in developing nations warring under unstable 
governments. At the same time, the globe is increasingly aware of the child soldier phenomenon 
to the point of commodification: stories told by former child soldiers about their time in military 
factions have garnered heavy popularity in the Western hemisphere. The dissonance between 
awareness and action is stark. 
The disparity between awareness and action reveals the inefficacy of the United Nation’s 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, a top-down human rights mechanism. As discussed in the 
Introduction, Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection is useful for investigating such ruptures in 
institutional authority, and more broadly, the Symbolic Order. In this circumstance, the power of 
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capitalism outweighs the influence of human rights dissemination. To frame this chapter, I will 
investigate how human rights literatures pander to Western consumer preferences, specifically in 
the use of the European Bildungsroman as a form that can distort or sanitize narrative content. I 
will then look into the ways author Ahmadou Kourouma pushes back against this tendency.  His 
novel Allah is Not Obliged confronts readers with a narrator who embodies the abject, a violence 
and chaos that Western consumers prefer to keep at a much greater distance (if not totally absent 
from the narrative altogether). Kourouma’s narrator, Birahima, has been read as a pícaro, a rogue 
postcolonial figure subverting the idyllic goals of the European Bildungsroman. However, I 
believe that with the knowledge of the abject, Birahima should be seen as a hybrid subject-abject 
figure, a deject of similar characterization to Uzodinma Iweala’s narrator Agu. Birahima’s 
subversive character is partially predetermined: the fate of his mother as a highly marginalized 
member of their village is then mapped onto him, and limits his options for survival. Birahima 
then willfully chooses a life on the margins of moral society, illustrating his retained subjectivity 
while living in close proximity to the abject. He seeks out and chooses a life of child-soldierdom 
for its real and perceived privileges on the fringes of moral society.  
  Many texts that discuss child-soldiering employ a first-person narrator and are modeled 
after the classic Bildungsroman genre familiar to a Western readership, therefore guaranteeing 
more attention in developed economies and prioritizing capital gain over the dissemination of 
equalizing rights norms. To challenge this trend, some authors have inserted subversive narrators 
into their texts to undermine the usual plot trajectory found in “coming-of-age” forms. Ahmadou 
Kourouma’s Allah is Not Obliged is one such novel. Young Birahima is a boy who joins a tribal 
militia in order to escape the impoverishment and social ostracization he experiences in his 
village of Togobala, Guinea. Allah is Not Obliged is a unique text in that it represents Birahima 
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as a victim of his familial and social environments, but also as a willful participant in civil 
warfare –solidifying his type as the deject figure as discussed in Chapter One.  This is in contrast 
to the more common tack of casting child soldiers as coerced, kidnapped, or otherwise 
unwilling/passive combatants. I argue that Kourouma characterizes Birahima first and foremost 
through the village’s persecution of his broken family and disabled mother, which illustrates the 
environmental conditions that can drive an individual to willfully participate in child warfare.  
✧   CONFLICT ZONES & CHILD DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the straightforward language of Article 38.2, “States Parties shall take all feasible 
measures to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a 
direct part in hostilities,” children around the world continue to be recruited for direct 
participation in armed combat. As Scott Gates and Simon Reich discuss in Security Continuum: 
Child Soldiers in the Age of Fractured States, child soldiers are most often used in countries 
saturated in civil conflict and “remain in a perpetual state of insecurity” (6). The psychological, 
physical, and economic effects on a person under continued threat are well-documented: Gates 
and Reich cite a higher probability for individual and group criminality, unemployment, lack of 
education, and domestic and sexual abuse (7). A child living in conflict is more vulnerable, as 
“the breakdown of traditional extended familial, communal, and broader societal structures has a 
severe impact on them, given their greater dependence” (8).  Like the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which calls the family unit “the natural and fundamental group unit of society,” 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child places primacy on the child’s right to developing in a 
loving, nurturing family environment. The child’s family name assists in conferring personhood, 
as all children “shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a 
name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for 
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by his or her parents” (“Office of the High Commissioner”). Living in a nation engulfed in 
hardship heightens the probability a child’s family and/or community will be fractured, leaving 
him or her with few options to meet basic needs, let alone grow up in a loving environment. This 
is precisely the circumstance the reader finds Birahima in: we learn that village authority 
consistently persecutes his mother for her disability, and the neighboring civil wars threaten the 
security of his nation as a whole. To escape persecution by village authority, Birahima ends up 
running away from home, returning only to say goodbye to his dying mother. In an effort to 
place Birahima in a more stable environment, his grandmother sends him to Sierra Leone to live 
with his Aunt. On the way, Birahima’s travel guide exposes him to the glamour and privilege of 
child-soldiering, something Birahima admires and aspires to. Over the course of the novel, the 
reader understands this choice as a result of his growing up in an unstable family and 
community, essentially exiled to a life of lack and pain by his own village. To better understand 
Birahima’s choice to live on the fringes of moral society and join the militaries of Johnson and 
Taylor, I turn to Julia Kristeva, who focuses heavily on both the development of the child and a 
given individual’s position amidst complex social structures.  
✧   PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY AND FAMILIAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Julia Kristeva operates in the tradition of Freudian psychoanalysis, which investigates the 
relationships and fragmentations that occur among individuals in a traditional family structure: 
child, father, and mother. The instance of child development most prescient to this discussion is 
in regards to the Oedipal crisis, in which the positions of the child and the mother become 
distinct and individuated. To be brief, the Oedipal crisis solidifies the mother as not me, and the 
child ultimately rejects her. Prior to this crisis, the mother was the site of total unification, a 
sublime expanse of complete cohesion. The child is unable to differentiate between the self and 
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the mother, perceiving them as one in the same. After the child enters the Mirror stage, there’s a 
distinct fragmentation that occurs. No longer identifying with/as the mother, the child rejects and 
excludes her under the watchful eye of the father, the utmost symbol of authority, order, and 
hierarchical categorization. Casting the mother off to a place of exile and negation is the child’s 
first psychosexual encounter with what Kristeva terms “abjection.” The child pushes the mother 
away in favor of acquiescing to the father’s authority and from there, the child begins to build an 
identity that starts with not my mother and is constructed around abiding by the rules of the 
father. 
Abjection, as described in Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, is the 
undercurrent—sensed, but not easily pointed to—of disruption and deconstruction that lies 
beneath the safe boundaries of systematization. Not an object, as objectification has utility in 
delineating boundaries of me and not me, there is only one characteristic of the abject: “that of 
being opposed to I” (1). The abject blurs the lines of order, collapses meaning in a way that 
reveals all category as constructed. The abject provides brief glimpses into the porousness of 
identity: the child must push the mother away in order to construct his own identity, making the 
mother representative of the chaos and confusion that erodes order and understanding. Because 
identity is reliant on a subconscious pull toward categorization and away from order, we can find 
the abject and our repulsion of it in our daily experiences. Bodily fluids, unsanitary conditions, 
and lifeless bodies trigger psychosomatic impulses to expel the threat of death and chaos, to 
bring us back into the neat categorization of me, an illusory wholeness for which we are 
constantly searching. 
These notions of exile, fragmentation, heterogeneity, chaos, negation, collapse, and 
borderline are what drive my reading of the child soldier, and more specifically, my reading of 
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Birahima in Allah is Not Obliged. Kourouma introduces the reader to Birahima through his 
relationship to his mother, making it clear that because his mother experiences the social and 
economic consequences of being disabled in a developing nation (and, as I will discuss, 
perceived as possibly demonic), Birahima understands himself as being marginalized in similar 
terms. In a way, this is mimetic of the child’s perception of himself and his mother being unified 
before he reaches the Mirror stage and that essential fragmentation occurs: he bears the social 
consequences of his mother’s disability as though they are one and the same. 
✧   ACKNOWLEDGING THE ABJECT IN CHILD SOLDIER NARRATIVES 
The novel is first set in Togobala, Guinea, where religion is the most pervasive form of 
authority, penetrating all aspects of social and cultural life in the village. Birahima’s introduction 
to this system of authority is primarily through his mother’s position in the village, and how she 
is treated at the mercy of the village law. It is undeniable that Birahima’s mother, who suffers 
physical disability, is discriminated against and persecuted for her visible difference. As a young 
girl, Birahima’s mother was circumcised as Malinké culture dictates. Her wound hemorrhaged, 
causing her to nearly bleed out. She lived through the ordeal, but suffered atrophied muscles and 
an amputation because of it. Her skin developed sores and ulcers, one of which never healed and 
repeatedly split open with infection. In order to avoid further sores, she uses her arms, legs, and 
rear to scoot on their hut’s dirt floor. Birahima’s family, though he never describes them as such, 
seems to be unable to provide her with any medical accommodations like a wheelchair or 
crutches. She is central to the first few chapters of the text, with Birahima insisting that, to tell 
the story of his life as a child soldier, he must first familiarize the reader with his mother’s 
condition. Religion is pervasively influential in Togobala culture, so her disability and physical 
presentation are often described in conflated terms of religious devotion and demonic association. 
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Birahima’s hybrid identity is first expressed through personal anecdotes about his mother, the 
psychosexual figure upon which Kristeva’s theory of abjection is allegorized. His first encounter 
with being an arbiter of pain, infection, and eventually, death, is enmeshed with his childhood 
memory and adolescent rejection of his mother.  
Birahima chooses to be a child soldier with little persuasion necessary. Though he is a 
citizen of Guinea and an of-age tribal member, he is decidedly shirking moral and religious 
norms in order to live a life of chaos, destruction, and violence. Julia Kristeva gestures toward 
similar figures when discussing abjection. Kristeva pulls characters from French literature, most 
of them scheming murderers, to illustrate the forces of abjection that are present in everyday life. 
She identifies this murderous, subversive person as the “deject.” “The one by whom the abject 
exists” (8) is an individual living on the borders of civil society, apart from the orderly forces of 
life and serving as an agent for destruction. The deject has exercised agency over his or her 
marginal existence and has willfully elected to live within sight of, but undoubtedly beyond, the 
purview of society’s orderly systems. This means the deject lives in a perpetual conflict zone, 
maintaining a proximity to life and death that he or she must constantly negotiate with agency 
and intention. Abjection itself is the collapse of meaning, the repulsive undercurrent of chaos that 
we must push away to know and negotiate the world through social and cultural systems of order.  
The deject operates as a medium through which chaos ruptures order, and in so doing, fluctuates 
in the chasm between substance and collapse, life and death, sublime and abject. Kristeva’s 
illustrations of the abject in literature heavily involve an undercurrent of deception, in which 
citizens scheme under the guise of social and moral complicity in order to shirk the normal rules 
of society and gain some sort of perceived or real advantage. A combination of murder and 
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desire is central to the deject’s character: he must willingly act in a way that places him on the 
outermost margins of accepted codes for social and moral conduct.  
Scholars have been attempting to understand the deject characterization in its literary 
iteration, particularly because of the interest the child soldier narrative garners. The child-soldier 
narrator in Ahmadou Kourouma’s Allah is Not Obliged is written as a deject: driven to child 
warfare in Sierra Leone due to economic hardship, but nonetheless voluntary, Birahima is a 
deject with a distinctive voice, a brash subjectivity that jars readers and challenges generic 
convention. As a deject, Birahima is a liminal figure: his proximity to the abject is undeniable, 
yet he is able to maintain subjectivity and speak from the borderlines of social exile, making 
clear his continued willingness to participate in child warfare. However, this perpetrator is also a 
victim: Birahima’s choice to enter into the wars is fueled by his systemic marginalization within 
the power structures of his village, pushing him to the chaotic fringes of social, economic, and 
religious normativity. In his village, being located on the fringes of normativity earned him 
ostracization, condemnation, and the intense familial suffering that comes with the ever-present 
threat of persecution. In the glamorous militaries of Taylor and Johnson, however, his fringe 
identification and behavior earns him privilege. Thus, it is my argument that Birahima’s 
victimization by the suffocating systems of power in his village prompted his willful entrance 
into child soldierdom, effectively giving him a hybrid character: that of the deject. 
Ahmadou Kourouma’s Allah is Not Obliged pushes the boundaries of narrator 
characterization in depicting Birahima as having choice, something essential to the deject’s 
existence.  However, I believe focusing on the environmental conditions outside of the narrator’s 
control will help readers to better understand the variables that result in the choice to join a tribal 
militia as a child. Environmental conditions, like the child’s position in village society, his access 
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to resources, and his family life, limit his options for survival. The question comes down to a 
simple dichotomy: does Birahima remain on the margins of his society and continue to struggle 
to live a dignified life in the village, or does he move further away from complicity in systems of 
order and benefit from the privileges given to young children who wield Kalishnikovs in times of 
civil war? To underscore the importance of the child-soldier deject’s voice, the tool he possesses 
to express himself within and through abjection, an exploration of the character must start by 
first placing trust in his self-identification. Birahima signifies himself as deject first by describing 
his relationship with his now-deceased mother, whom he refers to in the French maman.  My 
exploration will focus on how maman’s social position is crucial to understanding the multi-
layered marginalization Birahima experiences at the hands of village authority. 
✧   BIRAHIMA’S MAMAN: THE PREMISE FOR SYSTEMATIC PERSECUTION 
In psychoanalytic thought, the initial rejection of the mother is what signals a child’s 
passage into the Symbolic: by pushing away from the mother, the child begins to form a separate 
identity from her, one driven by the authority of the Father and his Laws. Though he does not 
have  a father’s influence, as he died when Birahima was a baby, he is well aware of the types of 
authority and Law imposed upon his and his mother’s lives. Birahima accesses an understanding 
of his place within systems of authority by watching his mother’s violent entrapment as a 
marginalized citizen within them, and, as an extension of his mother by kinship, begins to 
understand himself as similarly marginalized. Birahima and his maman’s location on the limits 
of normative Togobala society is multi-layered and palimpsestic, oppressing and determining for 
him a life of poverty and social ostracization. After witnessing his mother’s suffering and 
identifying himself as both an arbiter and receiver of it, Birahima willfully chooses a life on the 
margins, one that incorporates some facet of perceived or comparative privilege. This attempt at 
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maintaining agency through self-exile solidifies Birahima’s trajectory into child-soldierdom and 
an existence hovering on the outskirts of society, serving the force of horror and chaos: abjection. 
The narrative is mostly a travel log, as Birahima journeys to his Aunt’s house after his 
mother dies, crossing through conflict-ridden territories to do so.  Birahima finds it incredibly 
important to recount the events that led up to his time “in Liberia and Sierra Leone where I was a 
child doing tribal warfare, and where I got fucked-up on lots of hard drugs” (4), much of which 
includes his relationship with his mother and his experience in Togobala living with her.  As 
Kristeva would agree, examining a child’s relationship to his mother is integral to understanding 
how he negotiates systems of law and order. It is clear from the outset that Birahima’s 
association to his disabled mother helps inform him of his options in life, and lays out the 
choices he has before him for survival. The first, most important thing he needs the reader to 
know is that his mother lived with a noticeable disability: his maman moved around “on the two 
cheeks of her arse. She propped herself up on her hands and her left leg” (6). Birahima’s 
memories of his mother are characterized by suffering, punctuated with moments of joy. 
Birahima’s childhood was painful for his mother, physically injuring her with his toddling: 
I was crawling around all over the place and getting into everything. Sometimes, I’d fall 
on to maman’s ulcer and she’d howl with the pain. The ulcer would start bleeding. 
Maman would howl like a hyena with its paws caught in the teeth of a wolf trap. She 
would start crying. Maman had too many tears, the corners of her eyes were always full 
of tears and her throat was always full of sobs suffocating her. (9)  
Maman’s legs were injured and vulnerable, one described as a “shepherd’s crook,” the other a 
“crushed serpent’s head” that bore the burden of an un-healing lesion the Larousse lexicon 
describes as “necrosis of tissue” (5-6). The dichotomy of shepherd and serpent is a familiar one 
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to those in the Judeo-Christian tradition, referring to the imagery of Christ and Satan, 
respectively.  It is also consistent with Julia Kristeva’s description of the relationship between 
the abject and systems of order:  what control is to chaos, the sublime is to abjection (Powers 11). 
Within the same vein of religious rhetoric, one would say this ulcer was Birahima’s maman’s 
cross to bear. Or, as Birahima’s Muslim grandmother constantly proclaimed, Allah had 
“ordained [maman] to be miserable on earth” (9). As biblical embodiment, between her Christ-
like and demonic legs, maman’s body lay suspended between damnation and salvation. This 
echoes her precarious situation in the eyes of the village authorities, teetering on the material and 
symbolic planes of abjection. Birahima’s first memory of his mother involves physical harm and 
moral suffering, and therefore sets a precedent for the continued realization of himself through 
similar terms. The judgment of his village, which is guided heavily in terms of religious doctrine 
and a certain amount of predestination, solidifies Birahima and his mother as socially 
marginalized. 
✧   THE ABJECT AND THE SUBLIME: MAMAN AS DEMON AND MARTYR 
To his village, Birahima is a child conceived and borne of a woman who lived a life of 
bad omen, entering the world from a womb between the physical embodiments of damnation and 
salvation that were her amputated, atrophied, and withered limbs. The child asks readers to travel 
back with him in time, “prior to her circumcision” (14), that prompts the narrator to release all 
the information he has on the various religious sects found in the surrounding territories, falling 
somewhere on a scale from “pious Muslim” to “pagan animist” (16). He continues with an entire 
explication of various lineage and tribal tendencies to fall on a spectrum of religiosity and 
doctrinal devotion, which can be boiled down to an essentially “really good” and “really bad” 
child’s understanding of moral fortitude. It becomes clear that, to live in Togobala means to 
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understand and participate in a penetrative religious practice, one that is both inclusive and 
judgmental of variants. As the reader’s point of access to the complex systems of colonized and 
indigenous power systems is this child, the religious mechanisms of his culture remain ethereal 
and intangible to the reader, making it difficult to locate where, exactly, he and his family lie 
within the larger social structure of the village.  
However, as Birahima recalls his upbringing, it becomes clearer that maman’s disability 
places her on the fringe of normative social standings and religious devotion, the two being 
inextricably linked in Birahima’s village. The reader is soon informed that maman’s disability 
occurred during her circumcision ceremony, a rite of passage for Malinké women that ensures 
eligibility for marriage and status as an adult member of the tribe. Birahima offers an explanation 
for her injury, essentially a conflation of two possible events that contributed to his mother’s 
injuries, one a medical explanation and the other mystical. This reflects a pattern of medical and 
spiritual/religious explanations coexisting in the collective memory of the tribe. Because maman 
became injured prior to Birahima’s conception and birth, the reader can imply that Birahima is 
repeating the explanation(s) told to him by village or familial kin. The explanation is this: out of 
the group of girls chosen to undergo excision, Birahima claims that the ritual performer, or 
“djinn,” usually chooses the most beautiful for sacrifice. This justification is in contrast to his 
previous explanation, in which Birahima mentions that once all the girls were excised, maman 
was the only one whose blood would not clot. He then goes on to claim that maman, whose 
beauty was of epic proportions, was the one chosen for sacrifice. These two explanations, one of 
acute blood loss and the other of divine intervention, indicate to the tribal members that maman 
lived a life of poor omen. It is never clear to the reader if she was purposely injured for a ritual 
sacrifice, or if this was simply an unexpected complication. The fact that it does not seem to 
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matter underscores the significance of maman’s ambiguous categorization as both martyr and 
demon – either way, she is perceived as other, beyond the scope of what is deemed a normative 
Togobala existence.  
As a primer of our culture, and all aspects of our cultural identities, it follows that 
wherever there is religion, there is abjection. Kristeva concisely surmises this paradox, stating 
Abjection appears as a rite of defilement and pollution in the paganism that accompanies 
societies with a dominant or surviving matrilinear character. It takes on the form of the 
exclusion of a substance (nutritive or linked to sexuality), the execution of which 
coincides with the sacred since it sets it up. (17)   
This description of a sublime religious ideology contingent upon the recognition and exclusion 
of the abject closely aligns with Birahima’s description of the religious mechanisms at work in 
his village. Maman’s disability prevents her from following the proper social processes a young 
woman should perform: it arrests her ability to participate in social normalcy. The reader knows 
she sustained clear injuries from the excision ceremony, but she nonetheless survived it. 
Problematically, the pre-ordained outcome of the ceremony should have been either coming-of-
age and unification with the tribe, or sacrificial, god-condoned death. This alternative result, that 
maman was neither sacrificed nor achieved full passage into adulthood with a healed 
circumcision, can be either seen as an evil circumvention of Allah’s will or simultaneously 
pitiable and admirable martyrdom. Both categorizations mark her as someone who cannot fully 
participate in the social and cultural life of the village, diminishing her personhood in the eyes of 
the familial and religious authorities. 
For the Malinké tribe, the rites of excision and cleansing serve as both indigenous and 
Islamic mechanisms to rid the participant of their chaos and sin, to commit them to Allah while 
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fulfilling the necessity for a rite of passage as an adult tribal member. As John Walsh concisely 
states, Birahima’s village employs a “fusion of an animist belief system with Islam” that “plays a 
major role in the daily lives of [his] extended families” (186), as religion is inseparable from 
individual and collective identity. As both indigenous and Islamic practices coexist in the village, 
religion is tied to both familial and national belonging, penetrating the social, cultural, and 
governing institutions of the village. These layered hegemonic systems are what engulf 
Birahima’s maman, and Birahima recognizes how these systems affect her in a complex, almost 
ungraspable way: they essentially place her both in exile and entrapment, denying her full 
belonging in the village and keeping her in sight as a function of otherness.  Birahima, in 
identifying with his mother, perceives his position of liminality through her. 
To further complicate the village perception of Birahima and his family, Maman was 
widely known as being a participant in a non-traditional marriage, and community members 
considered it in their explanations of her perpetual ailments. Because she was visibly disabled, 
and unable to provide an income for her family, Birahima’s maman had to resort to non-
traditional means to ensure economic security for her family. After Birahima’s father died, his 
mother was, traditionally, to be transferred over to her brother-in-law as a wife. Birahima’s uncle, 
Issa, was not willing to marry his sister-in-law: “he was always saying cruel things about my 
father and my grandmother and even my grandfather…and anyway Issa didn’t want a wife who 
walked around on her arse with her rotting leg stuck up in the air” (22). So, the family 
determined “the tradition didn’t count” (22). Because the doctrine of the village religious leaders 
proclaimed that maman had to be married within a year of her husband’s death, she chose her 
mystic healer to wed. Her healer, who Birahima calls Balla, visits the hut every day to tend to 
maman’s wounds and spend time with Birahima. The village and family authorities determine 
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that maman would marry Balla in defiance of the village, who “were all dead set against the 
marriage because Balla was a Bambara kaffir [non-doctrinal practitioner of Islam] who didn’t 
perform the five daily prayers and didn’t fast during Ramadan” (23). In agreeing to wed Balla, 
maman entered into an unordained marriage, confirming her family’s othered status and ensuring 
them further consequences for being on the lowest rungs of society. 
The enmeshment of religious and social authority in the village wrought suffering for 
Birahima’s mother and family at all institutional levels. Even in seeking medical help, authorities 
punish the family for their existence outside normative social practices. After denying maman 
help for her ulcer, “the nurse said that what maman was suffering from was not a toubab 
[European] disease, it was a Black Nigger African Native disease. A disease that the medicine 
and the science of the white man could not cure” (17). Maman’s past actions and marginalized 
designation as disabled, disfigured, and broken are all written into her medical prognosis. Her 
marginalization is writ large, denying her the privileged attention of doctors trained in Western 
medicine. She is refused treatment, and told that “‘Only the grigris [medallions] of an African 
healer can heal your wound. If [the surgeon] operates on your leg, you will die, absolutely die, 
you will die like a dog” (17-18). To compound the significance of this refusal, Birahima justifies 
the outcome by stating that his mother was turned away by a nurse who “was a Muslim and 
could not tell a lie” (18). As Birahima illustrates, his maman’s suffering is condoned by 
organized religion, accepted by the village, and perpetuated by the competing power systems of 
social and ethical normativity.  
Birahima witnessed his mother’s pendulum swing toward the horizon of death and 
demonism only to be pulled back toward the living and morally righteous through various 
medicinal and spiritual rituals meant to save her leg and her life. The failure of these herbal 
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decoctions and blessings sent her health and moral characterization swinging back toward death 
once again, re-opening her wound and necessitating explanations of how she must have, in some 
way, made a moral failing for which she is bearing the consequences. 
The social ostracization and hardship Birahima experiences because of his mother’s 
disability causes him to express his own identity through the more superficial parallels of injury 
and healing. This gestures toward the more ephemeral concept of his living a liminal existence, a 
subject-abject position fostered by a brutalizing public discourse unable to locate him or his 
mother within normative modes of social understanding.  Birahima uses the village’s doctrine-
infused language to speak about his own existence, which is significant when considering his 
proximity to the abject and sublime. Birahima’s proximity to abjection works on both 
sociocultural and material levels, and the reader understands him through these terms by his 
articulated reflexivity: essentially, we know about it because he tells us.  
The linguistic expression of hybridity, of being both subject and abject, is evidence of 
Birahima’s retained autonomy. In considering the Symbolic, and more specifically, the margins 
of order, linguistic construction is our only referent to the unattainable truth of reality. Consider 
Kristeva’s introductory answer to the question, “Defilement—A Social Elaboration of the 
Borderline Patient?” In harkening back to the foundations of Lacanian linguistic theory, she asks 
the reader to consider, “Basic symbolic institutions; such as sacrifice or myths” which allow for a 
communal and individuated understanding of a given person’s compliance with social and 
cultural codes of conduct (72). In the grand narratives of religion and national history, one can 
find a safe niche, a position that helps them make decisions and stay in good standing with 
authority. As language is substantive of one’s consciousness and contingent humanity, so it is 
influenced and influences the extension of the self-community, that which establishes the 
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referential circuit of self-expression and hierarchical placement. Birahima internalizes the spoken 
reality of his community members, and articulates how easily his mother’s status, whether self-
perceived or that of the community, is molded and oppressed by palimpsestic systems of 
authority. This authority, “through frustrations and prohibitions… shapes the body into a 
territory” with markers that signal a “differentiation of proper-clean and improper- dirty, 
possible and impossible” (72). At any given time, Birahima’s mother is passively situated within 
these frameworks, physically and socially unable to lay claim to her own identity; perceived as 
unorthodox, unclean, and unworthy of medical interventions to alleviate her suffering. As a 
function of othering to the village, Birahima’s maman struggles to locate herself within the 
constructions of the phallic authority that rules over every aspect of village life: from medicine to 
marriage.  
✧   THE TRANSFERENCE OF ABJECT ASSOCIATION THROUGH KINSHIP 
Collective tribal memory is passed down to Birahima from his grandmother and mother, 
and now to readers: understood through a perceived brokenness and linked to moral 
weakness/fortitude, the narrator sets the foundation for his characterization through the 
simultaneously nourishing and infectious effects of his mother’s milk. Birahima ultimately 
rejects his mother, opting to live on the street instead of in their hut. As a baby, Birahima 
embraced a life filled with the pleasant stink of his maman and grandmother’s excretions and 
fluids, the putrid and comforting scents of an open wound and herbed goat meat. But as he 
became more cognizant of his mother’s position in the village, of her history with the tribe and 
her diminutive position within the power structures of the region, Birahima began pushing her 
away. In an effort to dissociate himself from his mother and her apparently evil nature, Birahima 
removes himself from the home and opts to live even further on the margins of society. A willful 
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orphan, Birahima attempts to win the admiration of his village by displacing himself from his 
demonic mother, who, among other rumors, was said to eat her own leg and the souls of her 
neighbors at night.  
After a failed interaction with a village healer that did damage to maman’s social and 
health statuses, the rumors about Birahima’s maman become unbearable for the young boy, who 
reports his own mother as “the leader of the soul-eaters” who would “devour souls…and even 
devour her own ulcer. That was why the ulcer never healed” (20). The rumors explain medical 
professionals’ unwillingness to treat her, as her sorcery is “why the ulcer never healed. No one in 
the world could ever heal her ulcer because every night my mother devoured souls and devoured 
her own rotting leg” (20). Such a grotesque description illustrates the primary example Kristeva 
provides as an experience with the abject: an attempt to ingest something perceived as toxic or 
infectious, which should be followed with the psychosomatic impulse to gag and expel the threat 
of death. Instead, Birahima’s maman is reportedly ingesting her own diseased leg, finding 
sustenance through illness and death. This rumor is the final judgment for Birahima, who can no 
longer bear the burden of his mother’s reputation. After being told this news by, assumingly, 
people he knows and trusts, Birahima is beside himself with sorrow. He decides to abandon his 
mother and dissociate from her demonism: “on the morning of the fifth day, I left maman’s hut 
forever and decided that I was never going to eat with maman ever again” (20). He lives life on 
the street, homeless, stealing for sustenance and venturing into the woods. It is not until Birahima 
hears of his mother’s death that he returns to his hut, to see his grandmother and mourn his 
maman.
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A village faith leader, the Imam, is in the hut tending to maman’s body and giving 
consolation to the family. Consider the profound, even laughable confusion embodied in the 
language of the following explanation for maman’s death, afforded to the reader in Birahima’s 
words: 
My maman died because Allah wanted her back. The imam said that a devout Muslim 
isn’t allowed to criticize Allah or say anything bad about him. Then he said that my 
mother didn’t die of magic, she died of her ulcer[…] and because the time Allah had 
accorded her on earth was up[…]Then the imam said that what the filthy old kaffirs had 
said was not true. He said it wasn’t true that maman used to magically eat away at her 
rotting ulcer at night. But it didn’t placate me and I started crying for my mum all over 
again. Then the imam said that I had not been kind to maman. (24) 
First, we see a predetermination by Allah to take maman back to heaven, the initial explanation 
offered to Birahima. He is reminded that he cannot be angry at Allah, because devout Muslims 
do not criticize or blame or say anything negatively about the highest authority. Remember that, 
at this point, it is well-established that Birahima and his family are anything but devout Muslims: 
as a result of his mother’s disability, they were unable to follow orthodox Muslim doctrine. He is 
then told that, in fact, the ostracization they were facing was totally unfounded: his mother was 
not dying of a magic demon that lived within her, it was a combination of Allah’s will and her 
chronic illness. This means that, not only did Birahima, maman, grandmother, and Balla suffer 
the social, medical, and economic consequences of being seen as non-normative, non-devout 
practitioners of Islam; but, Birahima’s attempt to escape this marginalization by leaving his 
mother was not going to be perceived as a positive dissociation by society. Instead of rejecting 
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his demonic kin in attempt to seek salvation, Birahima abandoned his suffering mother at the end 
of her life, an existentially punishable offense in the eyes of the religious and village authorities.  
From the beginning of his relationship with her, and the beginning of his life, Birahima 
has known and lived in proximity to the material threats of sickness, illness, and death: the 
symbolic experiences of the abject, the rotting ulcers and bodily fluids of one with chronic illness, 
living without community support and unable to receive proper medical attention. He has 
understood and withstood the consequences of living in marginalized oppression of religious and 
social authority, the two experiences inextricable. This realization, that he has abandoned his 
mother at her greatest time of need, occurs to Birahima with inconsolable force, and the 
narrator’s material enmeshment with the abject becomes clearer than ever. Birahima remarks that, 
“Even now it hurts, it burns my heart every time I think about maman’s death because I think 
maman really wasn’t a witch who devoured souls and that makes me remember the night she 
died” (24). In discussing this night, he refers to his mother as already corpse-like, as starting “to 
rot away, to really rot away” (25). He sleeps next to her decomposing body, and “in the morning, 
maman’s fingers were holding on to my arm so tight that Balla and my grandmother and another 
woman had to use all their strength to drag me away from my mother” (25). Birahima’s last 
memories of his mother are of her corpse, and the physiological realities of rigor mortis 
impressed on his living body.  
✧   THE DEJECT AS EXTENDING TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE TROPES 
Birahima’s deject character, however, includes a necessary proximity to the abject and 
articulated subjectivity. The deject figure is one who willfully lives in the chaotic margins of 
society, using law and order as a veil under which he may operate as that through which the 
abject exists. While much of Birahima’s exile from normative society is out of his control, he 
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makes it clear that he expresses willful subjectivity at two pivotal moments: first, his 
abandonment of his mother after hearing rumors of her demonic magic; and second, in his 
pursuit of a position in the militaries of Johnson and Taylor in Liberia. As illustrated, Birahima 
comes to regret his choice to dissociate from his mother; but his willful entrance into child-
soldierdom is articulated through consistent and audible agency. His unique voice, which 
punctuates the story with Malinké curse words and dictionary definitions from La Rousse 
Lexicon to help less-educated readers, has piqued the curiosity of many literary critics. Maureen 
Moynagh is one such critic who has noted his unique voice, attributing Kourouma’s style to the 
novel as written in the picaresque tradition.  While Moynagh’s investigation renders many 
fruitful observation, she neglects to consider the importance of Birahima’s relationship with his 
mother as being central to his liminality. 
Maureen Moynagh discusses Birahima in an investigation into the generic features of 
child-soldier narratives and its contributions to the public imaginary regarding tribal warfare. 
Moynagh’s essay, “Human Rights, Child-Soldier Narratives, and the Problem of Form” casts 
Birahima as pícaro. The picaresque genre originates in 16th century Spain, and portrays what 
M.H. Abrams defines in his Glossary of Literary Terms “the escapades of an insouciant rascal 
who lives by his wits and shows little if any alteration of character through the long succession 
of his adventures” (191). Termed after the Spanish for “rogue” (pícaro), the genre is both satiric 
and comedic, exposing the contradictions of society through laughable episodes that highlight 
the disconnect between reality and our ideal (unrealistic) perceptions of it. One of the most 
famous picaresque novels, Miguel de Cervantes’s Don Quixote, is noted as a “quasi-picaresque” 
(191) text foundational to the modern novel’s emergence in Victorian-era Britain.  Birahima 
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certainly fits the pícaro mold: the nonsense explanations he gives for his mother’s disability, and 
the justifications for the village’s persecution of his family, are absurd at their core.  
As Angela Hague notes, the most ubiquitous understanding of the pícaro is Claudio 
Guillen’s “Toward a Definition of the Pícaresque,” which casts the pícaro as an individual in 
conflict with his “inwardness and experience,” (212) “an outsider who must function in an 
environment ‘for which he is not prepared’” (212). The narrator must negotiate between inner 
concealment of the self and an outward performance of social roles, inserting philosophical 
musings on the irony of an impersonator playing a role, and society believing him. This 
negotiation puts the pícaro in the position of inserting personal musings on the machinations of 
society, an outsider positionality that “‘offers no synthesis of human life’” (Guillen as qtd. in 
Hague 213). Since this figure takes on different iterations dependent upon the fluctuating 
sociocultural environment in which it is produced, Moynagh goes on to further define Birahima’s 
embodiment of the pícaro, a subversive character that distorts the idyllic goals of the 
Bildungsroman and reveals the illusion of civic and social order. In response to many readings of 
Allah is Not Obliged as Bildungsroman, Moynagh believes Birahima distorts the lofty, 
transcendent end-point of the Bildungsroman. One can recognize the pícaro in that he ends 
exactly where he started: “he does not develop; instead, he comes full circle, back to his already 
fallen point of departure” (51).  While it may be clear to the reader that Birahima is not in any 
better a position at the end of the novel than he was at the start, Birahima has gained a 
considerable amount of control over his life, something unavailable to him in his mother’s hut. 
This is no small aspect when considering the environmental conditions that limit an individual’s 
options, compelling them to join militias at such a young age. Control is inherently linked to 
choice, and an examination of the narrator without due consideration of his relationship with his 
 62 
mother and the persecution he experienced in association to her is inadequate in fully 
understanding how one may choose a life on the outermost limits of social and moral codes: the 
life of the child soldier. 
✧   CONSIDERING CHOICE AND CONTROL: THE POWER OF PRIVILEGE IN EXILE 
Moynagh’s reading of Birahima as pícaro is not necessarily in challenge to the 
characteristics of the deject as set forth in the introduction, but it stops short of recognizing the 
source of the child’s willful liminality: his mother. In the reading the child soldier as picaresque, 
the character is outside of social norms and processes, beyond the space of integration. The 
pícaro happily teeters in a constructed state of “arrested development,” creating for himself an 
identity in opposition to progress that revels in a perpetual stuntedness. Birahima is a 
“moralizing” pícaro, one who “deplores his abject life in the name of a higher law that he is 
unable to respect” (Pavel as qtd. in Moynagh 52). This type of “moralizing” occurs when 
Birahima calls attention to the deplorable existence he willingly lives, always in the rhetoric of 
religion, damnation, and salvation. Moynagh believes Birahima “recognizes the absence of 
divine justice in his world; Yet he persists, despite his lack of education and his “bad French,” in 
his efforts to make some kind of meaning out of the moral economy into which he has been 
plunged” (52). 
 Birahima calls out the depravity of his situation using the necessarily religious language 
of his village to do so – something he learned by listening to and repeating the myths 
surrounding his mother’s illness. Moynagh echoes his rhetoric, stating that he is “damned,” 
living in “the absence of divine justice” and contending with the “moral economy into which he 
has been plunged,” yet she does not recognize the person responsible for his introduction to this 
moral economy.  Birahima identifies himself through the languages of religion and defilement, 
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the dichotomous dialect of his village, learned by listening to their judgments and contradictory 
explanations for his mother’s suffering.  
While edging toward a more ambiguous understanding of the figure with which readers 
might contend, Moynagh’s reading stops short of discussing the access point of Birahima’s 
subject-abject position: his introduction to, and further marginalization within, the complex 
power systems at work in his village. This point of access is designated as such by both cultural 
and social constructions, his first introduction to them through his mother’s position in the 
village. In experiencing her wrought existence within the religious and ableist systems of power, 
Birahima opts to locate himself outside of it, rejecting his mother, his religion, and devoting 
himself to an abject existence as an alternative to his undoubtedly precarious position within 
layered power systems. This is the choice of the child, who was once victim of social, religious, 
and economic ostracization but who later, with agency, lives willfully on the outskirts of society 
and speaks from a position of not only abjection and exile, but one of privilege. 
Birahima’s borderline existence in his village caused a hyper-awareness of hierarchical 
placement and the punishments or privileges associated with said placement. This is consistent 
with Kristeva’s theoretical deject, who, “instead of sounding himself as to his "being," he does so 
concerning his place: ‘Where am I?’ instead of ‘Who am I?’ For the space that engrosses the 
deject, the excluded, is never one, nor homogeneous, nor totalizable, but essentially divisible, 
fold- able, and catastrophic” (8). Birahima’s journey toward child-soldierdom is represented as a 
geopolitical journey: he travels to Liberia from Guinea, initially in an attempt to find his aunt, 
but decides to join a rebel faction along the way. He travels, quite literally, across the ethnic, 
linguistic, and territorial disputes fragmenting many West African states, confronting the 
catastrophic wars and systems as he goes.  
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The premise for the journey is to bring Birahima from the margins of normative existence 
and into the more ordered systems of citizenry. In the eyes of the village he had failed to follow 
social guidelines. Birahima admits he, “never went to the French school or even to the Qur’anic 
school,” instead “skipping classes to be a street kid or go hunting in the forests with Balla” (28). 
Even the adult supervision of Balla is seen negatively, as he was “teaching [Birahima] hunting 
and animism and magic instead of… the holy word of Allah from the Qur’an” (28). Afraid that 
Birahima would “grow up to be a Bambara kaffir… and not a proper Malinké who performs the 
five daily prayers,” (28) his grandmother sends him with an escort across the border of Guinea, 
through Sierra Leone to Liberia. 
Birahima and his guide, Yacouba, have similar tendencies, and both shirk normative 
moral practice in order to embrace a life of chaos and exile. We learn Yacouba is a conman, who 
frequently robs people of their investments and smuggles illegal goods from village to village. 
He tells Birahima of the glamorous factions of child soldiers found in Liberia, and the young boy 
quickly grasps their privileges, from “money…even American dollars” to “shoes and stripes and 
radios and helmets and even cars that they call four-by-fours” (37). Upon this realization, 
Birahima shouts in child-like excitement, “Walahe! Walahe! I want to go to Liberia. Right now 
this minute. I want to be a child-soldier, a small-soldier” (37). Thus, Birahima automatically 
locates the child soldier in a privileged position: though corrupt and morally ignoble, but 
certainly no less outcast, he would undoubtedly be in a place with more benefits than he 
currently experiences. According to Yacouba’s promises, Birahima’s life as a child soldier would 
reap him no more scrutiny from society as his life as his mother’s child did, but would award 
him with the economic advancement and physical power that were refused him by the authorities 
of Togobala.  
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Birahima’s choice to join the tribal factions is well-informed: in another obvious gesture 
of agency, Birahima guides the reader through a researched discussion of the current wartime 
climate in Liberia. The reader better sees how Birahima’s past as a “street kid”, his time on the 
lowest, most marginalized rungs of Togobala society, affords him privilege and safety on the 
even further margins of society and civilized warfare. Birahima’s subjectivity is retained, and 
even bolstered, through articulations that illustrate his knowledge-based choices. He is well-
versed in the history of non-government factions, naming the “four big important warlords: Doe, 
Taylor, Johnson, and Hajji Koroma” (44) and the resulting economic effects of their waged 
destruction, noting, “the small-soldiers don’t get paid. They just kill people and steal everything 
worth stealing…so as they have enough to eat and all the other stuff they need, [they] sell off 
everything they steal really cheap. That’s why in Liberia you can get everything really cheap” 
(44). Birahima voices the benefits of socially subversive economic practices in an elementary yet 
sound way. It seems as though further marginalization of oneself, and further enmeshment in the 
subversive chaos of tribal warfare, will earn Birahima more privilege than he could ever imagine 
by abiding by the normative social and moral codes of his village.  
As Kristeva claims of the deject, “the stray considers himself equivalent to a Third Party. 
He secures the latter’s judgment, he acts on the strength of its power in order to condemn, he 
grounds himself on its law to tear the veil of oblivion but also to set up its object as inoperative” 
(9). Birahima makes clear the structure of the tribal militia is loosely based on existing political 
and military operations, but is only used as a means to allow further chaos and destruction to 
exist. An arbitrary, pseudo-structure, “is skewed, a topology of catastrophe” (Kristeva 9). The 
scene in which Birahima describes sentencing and criminal prosecution in Liberia under the 
tribal militias illustrates this ‘topology of catastrophe,’ a thinly veiled “system” that acts as a 
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justification for the continued destruction of order. The child soldier benefits from the illusion of 
order, making it all the easier to engage in and benefit from dis-order. Although Birahima makes 
it known that stealing and thievery are pervasive practices necessary for survival, being caught 
doing so won thieves the death sentence. In Senniquellie (Liberia), 
[The convicts are] tied to wooden stakes and they’re blindfolded(…)Then they’re shot 
dead, to the applause of the lively, cheerful crowd. And in spite of everything, yes in spite 
of everything, some of the people watching are surprised to discover that, while they 
were clapping, thieves relieved them of their wallets because there are so many thieves in 
Senniquellie that executing a bunch of them won’t serve as a lesson for the rest. (101) 
And thus, the deject benefits from both the veil of order and systems, and the underlying chaos of 
abjection frothing beneath it.  Birahima is distinctive and deviant from the generic conventions 
of child-soldier narratives: he resists the categorization of victim, and reiterates his subjectivity 
from the margins of the Symbolic in a deliberate, disruptive manner.  
✧   CONCLUSION: HUMANITY, SUBJECTIVITY, AND ABJECTION 
Unafraid to discuss the paradoxical operations of his militia, Birahima revels in the 
rewards he reaps from them and is wholly unapologetic about it. Despite this, Kristeva makes 
clear the deject is not inhuman – he has the capacity to recognize, assimilate and participate in 
normative society; the revolution of his character is found in the fact that he chooses not to. Our 
tendencies to push the abject away from us are beneficial to the deject: we do not examine him 
too closely, we do not consider he may be something like us. This allows him to operate at the 
margins of chaos, negotiating this position between life and death at a relatively unobstructed 
pace. By hearing the deject, however, we are forced to contextualize him. This deject in 
particular, Birahima, takes great pains to explain his history, viewpoints, and choices to the 
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reader. He includes moments of great humor and trickery throughout his narrative of violence 
and death, allowing the reader to laugh with him despite the horrific circumstances. By allowing 
the deject his subjectivity, and creating a connection between the reader and the narrator, it is 
possible to find identification with him: confronting the component of his character that is 
steeped in choice is not far from asking oneself, “Would I choose the same?”  
In Chapter One, I discussed Agu’s material proximity to and active engagement with the 
abject in Uzodinma Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation. Iweala’s refusal to safeguard readers from the 
violent acts child soldiers willfully commit challenges the literary trends of sanitizing content to 
better serve Western audience preferences. It subverts the normative prioritization of comfort 
over realism to jar readers into questioning the easily consumable, black-and-white portrayals of 
child soldiers as absolute victims. In Kourouma’s Allah is Not Obliged, the focus on the 
narrator’s relationship to his mother not only furthers identification between the narrator and the 
reader— as all readers had a mother once— but also activates a critical delineation between what 
is in the child soldier’s control and what is outside of it. By focusing on the environmental 
conditions outside of his control, one may better understand the push-factors in his decision to 
join the tribal militias. To understand Birahima’s perception of the privileges he may earn on the 
outermost edge of order and chaos, it is crucial to first critically examine the systemic oppression 
that drove him further to the margins.  Birahima’s combined marginalization by religious, social, 
and economic authority left him with little choice, but a choice nonetheless.  
Kristeva’s theory of the abject, and this extended examination of the deject’s origins, 
have the potential to open up the liminal space between order and chaos. The existence of child 
militias is a rupture in the human rights environment, a multi-faceted system of authority that 
draws on religious, social, and economic understandings of justice and morality. While it may be 
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easier to categorize such instances as phenomena from a geopolitical distance, the reality is that 
there are observable conditions at work in the sociocultural context of these rights abuses that 
make the choice of child-soldierdom all the more appealing for participants. This, of course, is 
assuming that those involved in child militias are viewed as participants, those who have 
exercised choice over their lives in the only capacity they are allowed. The more participants are 
rendered in multi-faceted characterizations, in as much variety as there are victims, participants, 
and every categorization in-between, the more likely readers will begin conceptualizing the 
international rights environment as it is, not as it should be. 
The international imperative is to make sure these child soldiers will no longer have to 
serve as soldiers. But as Agu reminds us, war ensures they will never be children again. If we are 
to understand child soldiers as passive victims, unable to lay claim to the choices before them, 
what agency do they have in their own rehabilitation? Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Rehabilitation programs, put in place by organizations like the United Nations and UNICEF 
(Katz) are meant to provide former child soldiers a sense of purpose and value in re-committing 
to the social and moral mainstream of their societies. However, the majority of Westerners 
engaged with human rights literatures have a distilled view of the child-soldier experience in 
warfare according to simple dichotomies.  
Brigit Katz notes the programs initiated by Western organizations often fail to adequately 
address the range of difficulties involved in disarming former child soldiers because they are 
informed by rigid, gendered ideas of innocence and aggression. Katz recognizes that difficulties 
with rehabilitation are further complicated with female child soldiers, a demographic of 
combatant that continues to slip even further through the cracks of NGO programs. Girls are 
attracted to the opportunity to rise in military rank, where they “transform from frightened 
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recruits to vicious fighters, emboldened by a sort of power that they would not have acquired in 
the patriarchal communities where they were raised” (n. page). In essence, organizations are 
asking combatants to give up the privilege and power unavailable to them in normative society in 
order to reintegrate into a community that is both unstable and judgmental of its own citizens for 
their involvement in warfare (Katz). If predominantly Western organizations and authority were 
to confront the compounded liminality of the child soldier’s existence, they may be able to better 
address the obstacles in reintegrating those who knowingly and willingly choose to commit 
violence against their fellow community members. Conversely, it may assist in better equipping 
communities to re-absorb former child soldiers and entrust them with civic responsibility. I 
believe this abject-focused research should logically extend to a gendered space, where the 
female child soldier’s relation to the abject could be a tripartite investigation. It would be prudent 
to consider first her gender role in Freudian psychosexual development, then her material 
proximity to the abject in combat, and finally the compounded marginalization she faces in the 
village environment; her gender inevitably altering the latter two considerations. I believe a more 
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